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INTRODUCTION
This Article evaluates the provisions in the proposed Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: General Principles (Discussion Draft)
("Discussion Draft") addressing the element of "breach" in the tort
of negligence-that is, the provisions that explicate the substantive
content of the negligence standard. In light of the continuing debate
among tort theorists over the best understanding of negligence, the
Discussion Draft's take on negligence is a matter of some impor-
tance within the legal academy. Whether it is a matter of much
practical importance may be doubted. Under settled American prac-
tice, the jury applies the negligence standard to the facts it finds,
and renders only a general verdict that does not explain or justify
the outcome. Together with the rules effectively limiting judicial
review of jury verdicts to cases of manifest error, these features of
trial practice ensure that the operational meaning of negligence is
largely determined by juries in particular cases, rather than by the
doctrines stated in appellate decisions (and restated in Restate-
ments of Torts). Even if these practices are misguided, it is clear
that no Restatement could repudiate them without drastically de-
parting from the American Law Institute's ("ALI") traditional posi-
tion that Restatements are predominantly positive and only incre-
mentally normative.
On the other hand, the conception of negligence articulated
in the Restatement (First) of Torts ("Restatement (First)")--which
was carried over virtually unchanged into the Restatement (Second)
of Torts ("Restatement (Second)"), and hence has defined the ALI's
position for almost seventy years-has had an important influence
on the black letter law, on appellate review of jury verdicts, and on
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directed verdict practice in the trial courts.' Moreover, one might
reasonably expect that courts will rely on the Discussion Draft's
provisions in choosing jury instructions in negligence cases. This
expectation, however, is undercut by the large gap between con-
temporary pattern jury instructions, which typically tell the jury to
apply the reasonable person standard without explaining or defin-
ing it, and the Restatement and appellate cases, which typically in-
terpret negligence in cost-benefit terms. Experience thus suggests
that the Discussion Draft will have little impact on the negligence
instructions juries receive. That may depend, though, on how ag-
gressive the Discussion Draft is in recommending that courts in-
struct juries in accord with its formulations. In due course, I will
explore what the Reporter, Gary Schwartz, has done on this score,
and argue that it would be appropriate to do more.
In very general terms, it is evident that the Discussion
Draft-like its Restatement predecessors-endorses a version of
cost-benefit balancing as a central part of determining negligence.
Some torts scholars have argued that cost-benefit negligence is a
distortion of the traditional (and, they argue, normatively superior)
reasonable person standard.2 Were the Discussion Draft to adopt
that view, it would jettison the Restatement (First's risk-utility test
and simply rely on the reasonable person standard. Yet it would be
an extraordinary development, to say the least, for the Discussion
Draft to repudiate a major and at least moderately influential fea-
ture (risk-utility analysis) of the Restatements (First) and (Second).
Beyond that, as Gary Schwartz ably shows in the Reporter's notes
on Section 4 of the Discussion Draft, the Hand Formula balancing
approach is recognized as authoritative by judicial opinions in a
majority of states, by the leading torts treatises, and by most con-
temporary torts scholars. And while there is certainly still room for
argument about how strongly the courts are committed to Hand
Formula balancing, Schwartz rightly points out that there is no
American jurisdiction "whose cases explicitly (or by clear implica-
1. While appellate review of jury verdicts is unquestionably deferential, a recent study by
Eisenberg and Clermont finds that jury verdicts are set aside in a surprisingly high percentage
of cases in which an appeal is taken. See THEODORE EISENBERG & KEVIN CLERMOtm APPEAL
FROM JURY OR JUDGE TRIAL: DEFENDANTS' ADVANTAGE (Working Paper Series, 2000) available
at Social Science Research Network Electronic Library, www.ssrn.com.
2. See, e.g., Patrick J. Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety Contentions at the Heart of
Tort Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315 (1990).
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tion) reject the balancing approach as an interpretation of the neg-
ligence standard."
3
Accordingly, my focus in this Article will not be on whether
Hand Formula balancing is part of negligence law, but on how-
with what emphasis, what qualifications, what relationship to the
reasonable person standard, and above all what underlying value
judgments-Hand Formula negligence fits into the broader fabric of
negligence law. To put it slightly differently, I will be asking which
version of Hand Formula balancing has the best claim to adoption
by the Discussion Draft-and what to do if there's no clear winner.
With this in mind, I begin by laying out in Part I a basic conceptual
framework for thinking about the Hand Formula and the reason-
able person standard.
One candidate for "best in show," plainly, is the Restatement
(First)'s risk-utility approach, which enjoys the uninterrupted en-
dorsement of the ALI, and has also been cited approvingly by many
courts over the years. Following a trail blazed by Michael Green in
a valuable recent article, 4 I have concluded that the provisions of
the Restatement (First) on negligence are worthy of more attention
than they have received-and than the Discussion Draft gives
them. Accordingly, in Part II, I explore in some depth the Restate-
ment (First)'s balancing approach and the early scholarship by
Terry, Seavey, and Bohlen that heavily influenced that approach.
In Part III, I then consider Learned Hand's own version of "bal-
ancing" (the Hand Formula), and contrast Hand's approach, Rich-
ard Posner's interpretation of Hand's approach, and the Restate-
ment (First). Against this backdrop-which I hope holds some inter-
est in its own right for students of negligence-I analyze and cri-
tique the Discussion Draft in Part IV.
I. THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD AND THE HAND
FORMULA
It is necessary to begin with some conceptual preliminaries.
When it comes to giving a positive account of negligence, the "big
kids on the block" are clearly the reasonable person standard and
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 4 cmt. c (Discussion Draft Apr.
5, 1999) [hereinafter Discussion Draft].




the Hand Formula.5 The relationship between the reasonable per-
son standard and the Hand Formula can take several different
forms. Negligence law could use either one to the exclusion of the
other. It could also combine the two by characterizing the Hand
Formula as the test a reasonable person would use in deciding
which precautions to take to avoid accident risks to others.6 Finally,
it could use both as independent and alternative techniques for de-
termining negligence, with each assigned to its own sphere (and
with more or less overlap between those spheres).
Implicit in these claims is the proposition that the reason-
able person standard and the Hand Formula can each be conceived
in a variety of ways. Some of these conceptions make the two con-
verge, others make them diverge. For example, if the reasonable
person avoids imposing substantial foreseeable risk of harm on oth-
ers, no matter how difficult or expensive avoidance may be, then
the reasonable person standard is obviously at odds with the Hand
Formula. If, on the other hand, the reasonable person takes the
same care of the persons and property of others as of his or her own
person and property, then the reasonable person standard and the
Hand Formula can be seen as two idioms for the same idea-
namely, that sensible people balance pros and cons when deciding
how to deal with risks to themselves and should use the same crite-
ria when making decisions that involve risks to others. Alterna-
tively, the reasonable person standard can be defined in ways that
leave its relationship (if any) to the Hand Formula up for grabs. For
example, if the reasonable person follows the prevailing social
norms concerning accident risks, we need to know the content of
those norms before we can describe their relationship to the Hand
Formula.
The discussion so far has emphasized the range of behavioral
standards that could plausibly be used to explicate the reasonable
person standard. The Hand Formula can be subjected to a similar
analysis, but in order to do so we must first distinguish the two dis-
5. The Hand Formula is set forth in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173
(2d Cir. 1947) C'[]f the probability [of an accident] be called P; the injury, L; and the burden (of
adequate precautions] B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: ie.,
whether B < PLf). I use "Hand Formula approaches" as a shorthand for the whole range of
approaches that balance the costs and benefits, however defined, of taking greater care to avoid
an accident.
6. An important variant of this approach posits that a reasonable person uses the Hand
Formula as one-but not the only-source of guidance concerning how much care to take.
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tinct inquiries the Hand Formula requires. 7 The first inquiry is fac-
tual and descriptive: what was the probability of an accident given
the actor's behavior? What harm (or range of harms) would occur if
there were an accident? Would the precaution the opposing party
claims the actor should have taken have reduced or eliminated the
accident risk? If so, what costs (of any and every kind) would the
actor have incurred in taking that precaution? As Learned Hand
pointed out, it will often be impossible to arrive at a "quantitative
estimate" of any of the factors comprising the Hand Formula. 8 But
that observation does not alter the factual character of what is be-
ing estimated, be the estimate qualitative or quantitative. A jury
that finds that a drunk driver created a grave risk of a collision
that would cause serious personal injuries to another driver is en-
gaged in factfinding no less than a jury that, armed with statistical
information by the parties, is able to express its findings quantita-
tively.
The "Hand Factors," if you will, are thus the raw data to
which the "Hand Formula" is applied to determine whether there
was negligence in accordance with the "Hand Norm." The Hand
Norm tells us that it is negligent to omit a precaution if the reduc-
tion in expected accident costs would have been greater than the
costs of the precaution. The Hand Formula expresses the Hand
Norm in algebraic terms: it is negligent to omit a precaution if PL >
B. But factual information about each of the Hand Factors is not
enough to apply the Hand Formula. That information must be
evaluated in a way that allows for the comparative judgment re-
quired by the Hand Norm. For example, suppose that a surgeon
could, by ordering tests costing $1,000, have obtained additional
information about his patient's condition that would have avoided a
1% chance of a surgical injury that would deprive her of the use of
her left leg. These facts relating to the Hand Factors only set up the
problem; they cannot solve it. To compare $1,000 with a 1% chance
7. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1029-32
(1994); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 311 (1996).
8.
[O]f these factors care is the only one ever susceptible of quantitative estimate,
and often it is not. The injuries are always a variable within limits, which do
not admit, of even approximate, ascertainment; and, although probability might
theoretically be estimated, if any statistics were available, they never are; and,
besides, probability varies with the severity of the injuries.
Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949).
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of losing the use of a leg, the decisionmaker must make a value
judgment.9
It is a question of law what criterion should be used to make
these value judgments. Just as there is a range of ways in which
the law could conceive of the reasonable person standard, so there
is a range of ways in which the law could conceive of the Hand
Norm.10 Here are some of the salient alternatives one encounters in
contemporary torts scholarship:
(1) The willingness-to-pay approach, which inter-
prets the Hand Norm as intended to maximize
wealth, and expresses the Hand Factors in mone-
tary terms. This approach has long been champi-
oned by Richard Posner and William Landes."
(2) The utilitarian approach, which interprets the
Hand Norm as intended to maximize social wel-
fare, and expresses the Hand Factors in terms of
utility. This is the approach favored by welfare
economists such as Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell.12
(3) The social contract approach, which interprets
the Hand Norm as calling for balancing freedom
of action against security so as to maximize the
overall well-being of individuals. Gregory Keating
has developed this approach as central to a Rawl-
sian account of fair terms of social cooperation in
the realm of potential accidents.
13
9. The need to make a value judgment should not be confused with the issue of "objectiv-
ity," which can arise as to both facts and values. For example, the law could elect to focus on
how hard it would be for the average person to take some precaution, rather than on how hard it
would be for the actor to have done so. Similarly, the law could elect to focus on how the average
person in the community would value the cost of taking a precaution, rather than on how the
particular actor would value it. Nor must the issue of objectivity be resolved in the same way for
facts as for values. One can imagine a negligence standard that inquired into the actor's actual,
"subjective" precaution costs, but evaluated those costs by using prevailing community values or
some other "objective" method.
10. For a full and very insightful exploration of this point, see Kenneth W. Simons, The
Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness as Well as
Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901 (2001).
11. See WILLIAM IV LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcONoMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAw (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMtS OF JURISPRUDENCE 353-92 (1990); Faya v.
Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
12. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS VERSUS HUMAN
WELFARE: ON THE EVALUATION OF LEGAL POLICY, ch. 3 (Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 277,
Mar. 2000).
13. Keating, supra note 7, at 312-13.
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(4) The egalitarian approach, which interprets the
Hand Norm as supporting an egalitarian goal of
equal resources, and deploys the willingness-to-
pay criterion for that purpose. Ronald Dworkin
proposed this approach in Law's Empire.
14
(5) The virtue-based approach, which interprets the
Hand Norm as commanding that persons choose
prudently and jettisons the Hand Formula, but
uses the Hand Factors to try to arrive at an intui-
tive understanding of which course involves the
lesser evil. James Gordley argues for such an ac-
count of the reasonably prudent person (which he
traces to Thomas Aquinas). 15
The fact that a wide range of normative views can plausibly
be used to ground the Hand Formula and guide evaluation of the
Hand Factors matters for several reasons. 16 First, we can say that
the Hand Norm-in its most general, inclusive form-stands for the
pragmatic proposition that persons should choose to take greater
care when the expected good consequences outweigh or overbalance
the expected bad consequences. All of the approaches summarized
above agree that-in the limited context of individual decision-
making about the accident risks to others associated with one's
conduct-persons should compare the expected consequences if they
take greater care with the expected consequences if they do not.'"
14. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 276-313 (1986).
15. James Gordley, Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition, in PHILOSOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS
OF TORT LAW 131, 147 (David Owen ed., 1995) ('[While they thought that a prudent person
would weigh factors like those of the Hand formula, Thomas and Cajetan had a different idea
from modern economics of what it meant to do so .... [They] were discussing virtue. For them,
an outcome is good or evil, and a prudent person will seek or avoid it, to the extent it furthers or
detracts from the distinctively human life that is one's ultimate end. Morever, they did not think
that a prudent person could make his decision by any sort of calculus or deductive argument. A
prudent person moves from the premise 'the greater evil is to be avoided' to the conclusion 'this is
the proper course of action' by means of a minor premise 'this course of action avoids the greater
evil,' which is not itself demonstrable but is apprehended by a type of prudence (intellectus for
Thomas, nous for Aristotle) which has been translated as 'understanding' or 'intuition.' ")
Drawing on Smith and Hume rather than Aquinas, Heidi Li Feldman argues for a virtue-based
understanding of the reasonable prudent person standard, in which the Hand Formula plays
little if any part. Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and
Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431 (2000).
16. This Article does not address the normative question of which conception of the Hand
Formula is best as a matter of legal policy.
17. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 270-72 (1996).
Hurd maintains that deontologists can accept the consequentialist, Hand Formula conception of
negligence. Her basic argument is that deontological rules trump consequentialist considera-
[Vol. 54:3:813
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Second, it may be that there is something close to consensus
in support of using the Hand Factors to structure the factual in-
quiry into negligence, yet wide disagreement on how the evaluation
of those factors is to proceed. If so, that raises an important ques-
tion about the role of the Discussion Draft: should it choose the con-
ception that has the most support in the case law, the "best" con-
ception that has some support in the case law, or a very general
"umbrella" approach that is consistent with a wide range of Hand
Norms?
Third, descriptive assessments of negligence doctrines and
negligence cases must bear in mind that there are many Hand
Norms, not one. The Hand Norm or "balancing" approaches all
agree that evaluating the good and bad consequences of choosing
more or less care is crucial to which choice a reasonable person
would make. But they differ as to how those pros and cons should
be evaluated.18 Consequently, the mere fact that a court looks to the
consequences of the challenged aspect of a party's conduct does not
tell us that the court endorses every (or any) particular conception
of the Hand Norm.
Fourth, the plasticity of the Hand Norm raises questions
about jury instructions parallel to those we touched on earlier in
discussing the reasonable person standard. Let us assume that
courts were to agree that some version of the Hand Norm should be
used to define unreasonable conduct. The next question is whether
this conception of the Hand Norm is to be enforced via jury instruc-
tions or only via appellate review. Enforcement at the jury level
could be minimal, weak, or strong. Minimal enforcement would
simply track existing practice, giving the jury an undefined reason-
able person instruction, with no reference to the Hand Formula.
Weak enforcement would employ an open-ended Hand Formula in-
struction telling the jury to balance the Hand Factors without tell-
ing it how to balance them. Strong enforcement would employ in-
structions telling the jury what criterion it was expected to use to
evaluate the Hand Factors.
tions, but that many areas of life are not governed by deontological rules. In those realms, con-
sequentialism is the appropriate source for moral (and legal) norms. Alternatively, as Professor
Simons argues in his contribution to this Symposium, a deontological theory might treat the
expected consequences of a person's act as relevant to the actor's fault, while rejecting the strong
consequentialist claim that the act's rightness or wrongness depends solely on the favorability of
the outcome. See Simons, supra note 10 at 909-14.
18. They may also sometimes differ as to whether a particular consequence should be re-
garded as good or bad.
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II. THE RESTATEMENT (FIRST)'S CONCEPTION OF
NEGLIGENCE
A. The Reasonable Person and Risk- Utility Analysis
In order to put the Discussion Draft's conception of negli-
gence in perspective, it will be helpful to work through the ap-
proach taken by the Restatement (First). Because the Restatement
(Second) made only minor changes to the relevant provisions, the
Restatement (First)'s conception of negligence has effectively been
the ALI's official position for almost seventy years. The Restatement
(First)'s approach has been influential in the courts. Indeed, as Mi-
chael Green has suggested, it may well have inspired Learned Hand
to propound his Formula.19 Beyond that, while I would not make
any grand claims that the Restatement (First) was a Constitution
for tort law, it was the product of sustained deliberations among
leading torts scholars, judges, and lawyers over more than a dec-
ade.20 Finally, the Restatement (First)'s heavy debt to early torts
theorists such as Henry Terry and Warren Seavey, and its com-
paratively tenuous grounding in the then-prevailing black letter
law, raises issues with interesting parallels for the Discussion
Draft.
For as long there has been a tort of negligence, American
courts have defined negligence as conduct in which a reasonable
man (nowadays, a reasonable person) would not have engaged. 21
The Restatement (First) accordingly gave "marquee billing" to the
reasonable person standard.2 2 Section 282 defines negligence as
conduct falling below "the standard established by law for the pro-
tection of others against unreasonable risk of harm."23 The standard
established by law, in turn, is the behavior of "a reasonable man
under like circumstances." 24 By implication, therefore, an "unrea-
19. Green, supra note 4, at 1606-07.
20. Francis Bohlen was appointed Reporter and commenced work on the Restatement (First)
in June 1923. The first two volumes, including the provisions on negligence, were published in
1934. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS xiv (1934). Judges such as Cardozo and Hand (though
not Holmes) were deeply involved in this collaborative venture. Id. at xii-xiii.
21. Many courts speak instead of a reasonably prudent or careful person, and this difference
may be an important one. See Feldman, supra note 15, at 1432-35 (arguing that these instruc-
tions are meant to appeal to a virtue-based conception of reasonable care). As we will see, al-
though the black letter text of the Discussion Draft simply speaks of the reasonable person, the
commentary also endows that person with the virtues of prudence and carefulness.
22. Green, supra note 4, at 1630.
23. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 282.
24. Id. § 283.
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sonable risk" of harm to others is a risk the reasonable person
would not take. 2
Thus, the Restatement sets up the reasonable person as the
template for determining negligence. 26 Importantly, the reasonable
person plays this role in negligence per se as well as ordinary negli-
gence cases. Section 285 provides that the reasonable person stan-
dard may be established by statute or judicial decision, or it may
simply be "applied to the facts" by the factfinder in the absence of a
statute (or decision). According to the Restatement, in enacting a
prohibitory safety statute, "the legislative body declares its opinion
that the risk involved is unreasonable," thereby "defining what it
regards as the standard conduct of a reasonable man."27 Moreover,
the reasonable person is expected to "know the statutory and com-
mon law, in so far as it establishes a standard of obligatory behav-
ior, at the risk of incurring liability if he falls below it . . . ."2 The
theory of the Restatement, therefore, appears to be that the reason-
able person is expected to know and comply with the legislature's
statutory judgments about which risks to others (and self) a rea-
sonable person should avoid.2
This brings us to the case-by-case application of the reason-
able person standard. Rather than simply providing that the jury
should decide how a reasonable person would act under the circum-
stances, the Restatement (First) adopted a balancing (or Hand
Norm) approach some years before Learned Hand first articulated
the Hand Formula.30 The Restatement's approach takes the form of
a risk-utility test: "the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent
if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards
25. I will take up shortly the relationship between this implicit definition of "unreasonable
risk" and the Restatement's explicit definition of "unreasonable risk" in terms of risk-utility bal-
ancing.
26. The discussion in the text omits the important provisions in the Restatement (First)
making recognizable (Le., reasonably foreseeable) risk a necessary condition for the existence of
an unreasonable risk. Id. §§ 289-90. The reasonably careful person standard also controls the
application of this requirement As Section 291 phrases it, the question is whether "the act is
one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of harm to another ...." Id.
§ 291.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 cmt. i (1965).
28. RESTATEMENT (FIRS?) OF TORTS § 290 cmt. n.
29. Presumably the same reasoning would apply to rules specifying reasonable care an-
nounced in judicial decisions.
30. Green, supra note 4, at 1606-07. Professor Green points out that Gunnarwon v. Robert
Jacob, Inc., 94 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1938) rather than Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d
Cir. 1940), is the first case in which Hand described a risk-benefit test for negligence. Id. at 1606
n.10. The court noted in Gunnarson that "[i]n such cases liability depends upon an equation in
which the gravity of the harm, if it comes, multiplied into the chance of its occurrence, must be
weighed against the expense, inconvenience and loss of providing against it."
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as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is
done." 31
Now, one might argue that this language effectively substi-
tutes a risk-utility inquiry into "unreasonable risk" for an inquiry
into what a reasonable person would have done, thereby supplant-
ing the reasonable person standard. This interpretation is superfi-
cially appealing but incorrect. The Restatement's theory in fact in-
corporates risk-utility balancing into the decisionmaking of a rea-
sonable person. The Restatement argues that a reasonable person
impartially and disinterestedly balances risk and utility in making
judgments about whether conduct is unreasonably risky.
32 Com-
ment c to Section 291 states that the actor's judgment as to whether
a risk is unreasonable "must conform to the standard of a reason-
able man." In turn, Comment a to Section 283-which sets forth the
qualities possessed by the reasonable person-explains that the
judgment of the reasonable person is based on "whether the magni-
tude of the risk outweighs the value which the law attaches to the
conduct which involves it. This requires not only that the actor
should give to the respective interests concerned the value which
the law attaches to them, but also that he should give an impartial
consideration to the harm likely to be done' the interests of the
other as compared with the advantages likely to accrue to his own
interests, free from the natural tendency of the actor, as a party
concerned, to prefer his own interests to that of others." 33
I will have more to say shortly about this remarkable-and I
think undeniably moral-conception of the reasonable person stan-
dard. The immediate point is that the risk-utility test is clearly
meant to be an aspect of the reasonable person standard, rather
than a replacement for it. According to the Restatement, in the ab-
sence of a statutory command, the reasonable person is an impar-
tial risk-utility balancer. As Bohlen put it in a revealing Reporter's
Commentary on the 1929 Tentative Draft, the question is "not
merely ... what a reasonable man would do, but... what a reason-
able man would do with his attention centered upon the risk which
his conduct involves and the gain to society or to himself, and
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291.
32. See id. § 291 cmts. c, d, & e. The actor's judgment as to whether a risk is unreasonable
"must conform to the standard of a reasonable man, neither more nor less." Id. § 291 cmt. c.
33. Id. § 283 cmt. d (noting that the reasonable person is "reasonably 'considerate' of the
safety of others and does not look primarily to his own advantage").
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through himself to society, which is likely to result from his con-
duct."
34
But why does it matter whether risk-utility balancing takes
place "inside the head" of the reasonable person, 35 or instead is a
free-standing inquiry that makes the reasonable person superflu-
ous? I suggest that there are important rhetorical and cognitive dif-
ferences between these alternatives. The free-standing approach is
reminiscent of the economist's assumption that people behave as if
they were rational. It invites the court (or jury) to apply an external
Hand Formula analysis to the behavior of the actor whose conduct
is in question. By contrast, the inside-the-head approach links the
Hand Formula to intuitions and experience about how reasonable
people behave.3 6 In effect, it posits that cost-benefit analysis is an
important part of practical reasoning about accident avoidance. Be-
cause they are not trained economists, judges and juries (especially
juries) are more likely to resist-and less likely to be adept at-
cost-benefit analysis presented as a free-standing methodology.
They will find it easier, more appealing, and more useful to refer to
the Hand Formula for guidance when it is presented as a central
feature of the reasonable-person standard than when it substitutes
for that standard. They will be encouraged to bring to bear both
imagination and calculation. Furthermore, they will be doubly re-
minded-once by the structure of the Hand Formula, and once by
the structure of the reasonable-person-in-the-circumstances in-
quiry-that the assessment of negligence is to be done ex ante
rather than ex post.
B. How Risk-Utility Works: Analysis of Factors
The next set of questions concerns how risk-utility balancing
works. Although the relevant provisions of the Restatement (First)
are somewhat murky, in the end they track the Hand Formula
quite closely. To decipher the Restatement, it is best to begin with
Henry Terry's pioneering account of the calculus of risk in his 1915
34. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, Commentary on Section 172, Tentative Draft No. 4
(1929). Michael Green gets the credit for discovering this important source. Green, supra note 4,
at 1628-29.
35. Thanks to Neal Feigenson for suggesting this characterization.
36. To be sure, in everyday life there often is not time or occasion for cost-benefit analysis,
because one is guided by rules of thumb, habits, or other behavioral shortcuts. Yet, reasonable
people commonly consider costs and benefits in a variety of contexts, and calibrate their behavior
accordingly. In addition, of course, the reasonable person looks to laws, social norms, customs,
habits, experience, intuition, and anything else practical reason might usefully draw on.
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article on negligence, 37 on which Bohlen drew heavily in drafting
the Restatement. Terry defined negligence as "conduct which in-
volves an unreasonably great risk of causing damage," while like-
wise affirming that the actor "must judge and decide as a reason-
able and prudent man would."38 But whereas Learned Hand would
later set out three factors for determining whether a risk was un-
reasonable, Terry used five: the chance of harm (Hand's P), the
value of what will be harmed (Hand's L), and, on the other side of
the balance, three factors: the value of the actor's goal, the utility of
the actor's conduct in achieving that goal, and the necessity of the
actor's conduct to achieve that goal. These three factors are aspects
of Hand's B: they measure the actor's expected gain from not taking
greater care, which is the obverse of the actor's expected loss from
taking greater care. Thus, Terry's analysis tracks each of the Hand
Formula factors.3 9
Yet, there is a difference between Terry's approach and the
Hand Formula, and that difference carries over to the Restatement
(First). Unlike the Hand Formula, which on its face is completely
silent regarding whether, and if so how, B, P, and L are to be
evaluated, Terry's language explicitly calls for judgments about the
values of PL and B. The Restatement (First) both follows Terry's
lead and specifies how those judgments are to be made.
37. See Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915); see also HENRY T. TERRY,
SOME PRINCIPLES OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 175-78 (1884). Michael Green has traced Terry's
influence on Bohlen, Seavey, and the Restatement of Torts. See Green, supra note 4, at 1622.30;
see also LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 6 (1941) (suggesting that many of
Terry's ideas on negligence "became incorporated into Sections 291, 2, and 3 of the Restatement
of Torts").
38. Terry, supra note 37, at 40-41.
39. Indeed, although Terry's notation is more awkward, it spells out more clearly than
Hand's that the issue is the marginal costs and benefits of additional precautions. Consider the
example Terry used-the famous case of Eckert v. Long Island Railroad Co., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
Eckert was killed trying to rescue a child about to be struck by one of the defendant's trains, and
the railroad argued he shouldn't recover because he had been contributorily negligent. For Terry
(as for Hand) the risk consisted of the chance that Eckert would be killed multiplied by the loss
of his very valuable life if he were. To avoid that risk, Eckert could have taken the precaution of
not trying to rescue the child. To take that precaution for Eckert's own safety, however, would
have meant the child would not be rescued. A simplistic Hand Formula analysis would therefore
say that B was the value of the child's life. Terry's analysis looked more discriminatingly at the
facts by asking the marginalist question: how much did Eckert's attempt to rescue the child
increase the child's chances of survival? If the attempt at rescue couldn't possibly have suc-
ceeded, then nothing would be lost by not making the attempt. In other words, B would have
been zero. Conversely, if the child would have been saved anyway, B would also have been zero,
Put differently, B is the difference in the child's probability of survival attributable to Eckert's
attempt to rescue it, multiplied by the value of the child's life. (On the facts, Terry plausibly
judged that this difference must have been fairly great, because Eckert did rescue the child).
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Thus, the factors the Restatement sets out for determining
whether a risk was unreasonable include both factual and evalua-
tive elements. To determine the magnitude of the risk (Hand's PL),
Section 293 calls for consideration of "the extent of the chance" that
the actor's conduct will cause harm40 (Hand's P), "the extent of the
harm likely to be caused to the interests imperiled"41 (Hand's L),
and "the number of persons" exposed to harm (likewise an aspect of
Hand's L).42 Section 293 also lists another factor, however--"the
social value which the law attaches to the interests which are im-
periled" -that specifies how value judgments about accident risks
are to be made. This factor is a Hand Norm with no analog in the
Hand Formula itself.
A similar mixture of factual and evaluative factors surfaces
in the Restatement (First)'s framework for determining B in the
Hand Formula-which, in the Restatement's cumbersome formula-
tion, is represented by the utility of the actor's conduct or the utility
of "the particular manner" in which the actor behaves. 44 These fac-
tors (which closely track Terry's) include "the extent of the chance"
that the actor's interest will be advanced by the conduct 4s (Terry's
"utility of the risk"), and "the extent of the chance that such inter-
est can be adequately advanced or protected by another and less
dangerous course of conduct 46 (Terry's "necessity of the risk"). Also
included, however, is a plainly evaluative factor--"the social value
which the law attaches to the interest which is to be advanced or
protected by the conduct"47 -with no analog in the Hand Formula.
The analysis up to this point has shown that the Restate-
ment's factual analysis can fairly be characterized as a precursor of
the Hand Formula. Bohlen followed Terry, and Hand agreed with
them, while pruning the list of factors into a simpler form that
40. RESrATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 293(b) (1934).
41. Id. § 293(c).
42. The idea appears to be that L is higher if several persons face some constant probability
of injury than if only one person does.
43. Id. § 293(a).
44. Id. § 291(1). Although inelegantly expressed, the idea seems clear enough: the objection
to an actor's conduct may be that the activity was unreasonably risky, or that the actor engaged
in the activity in an unreasonably risky way. The Restatement thus brings both the actor's
choice of activities and the actor's choice of precautions within the ambit of the negligence in-
quiry. (There is no indication, however, that the Restatement anticipated modern economic
analysis of activity-level issues concerning the frequency, extent, or intensity of an activity. See
generally Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980)).
45. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 292(b).
46. Id. § 292 (c).
47. Id. § 292 (a).
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could more readily be expressed as "an equation."48 But this de-
scription of the relationship between the Restatement (First) and
the Hand Formula ignores the evaluative dimension. As I will dis-
cuss at greater length in Part III, Learned Hand's way of stating
the Hand Formula removes the question of value judgments from
the calculus of risk-though without in any way denying that those
value judgments need to be made. That, however, was not Terry's
approach. Rather, he stated the two sides of the ledger in terms of
the "value" of what was at stake. The Restatement also takes this
approach: on both sides of the risk-utility balance, it calls for meas-
urement in the common coin of "social value," and it interweaves
the factual and evaluative aspects of the inquiry by treating the
social values of the conflicting interests as "factors" in the risk-
utility test.
C. How Risk- Utility Works, Continued: Evaluation of Risk
and Utility
The next step is to unpack the Restatement (First)'s approach
to evaluating the Hand Factors. The two central features of the Re-
statement's account are its choice of "social value" as the metric for
weighing risk against utility, and its insistence that the relevant
social values are those "which the law attaches to the interests"
that are (on the risk side) imperiled and (on the utility side) pro-
tected or advanced by the actor's conduct. The Restatement says
that "what the law regards as the utility of the actor's conduct" is
determined in light of the social value the law attaches to the inter-
est in question. For the Restatement, then, human beings have
various interests, and those interests have more or less social
value. 49
The burning question, however, is how we determine what
social value the law attaches to these multifarious interests. 0 Aside
from endorsing certain obvious propositions-for example, that the
48. Gunnarson v. Robert Jacob, Inc., 94 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1938); see also Moisan v.
Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949) (alluding to "an equation for negligence").
49. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 1 ('CThe word 'interest' is used throughout the Re.
statement of this Subject to denote the object of any human desire.").
50. The Restatement (Firstys choice of the term "social value" (rather than simply "value")
may have been a signal to progressives that the Restatement was not committed to a neoclassical
theory of subjective value. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism
and the Separation of Law and Economics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 805, 826-35 (2000) (discussing the
progressive theory of social value). My failure to pursue these sorts of questions in this Article
should not be taken as a suggestion that they are unimportant. It would be useful to know more
about the broader intellectual context of the Restatement (First).
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social value of an activity such as manufacturing includes its bene-
fits to "the whole community"SL-the Restatement largely sweeps
this problem under the table. Its brief discussions of legal valuation
contain some uncontroversial comparative judgments about social
value-for example, that the risks of carefully operated railroads
are "more than counterbalanced by the service which they render
the public."52 That explains why we subject railroads to negligence
liability rather than banning railroading. But it tells us nothing
about how to use "social value" to help determine what precautions
a reasonably careful railroad would take.
Similarly, the Restatement informs us that it is reasonable to
create greater-than-normal risks when an interest "to which the
law attaches a preeminent value" is at stake.53 While that explains
why speeding may be justifiable in "pursuit of a felon or in convey-
ing a desperately wounded patient to a hospital,"54 it does not tell
us when the value of driving (carefully) justifies the risks. Indeed,
on that question, the Restatement argues that the law regards the
freedom to travel by highway "as of sufficient utility to outweigh
the risk of carefully conducted traffic," regardless of how unimpor-
tant a particular trip may be.55 Now, this refusal to engage in case-
by-case evaluation of social value may well be justified in the case
of driving,56 but it also illustrates the limits of the Restatement's
strategy of deriving guidance about social values by looking at our
existing safety laws and practices. The judgments embedded in
those sources of authority are typically too general and categorical
to be of much use in deciding negligence cases.
Perhaps in tacit recognition of this difficulty, the Restate-
ment (First) also appeals to public opinion as a source of legal
valuation. Section 292 asserts that "[t]he value attached by the law
51. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 292 cmt. a CThe irreducible minimum of risk both to
employees and outsiders which is inherent in manufacture is not regarded as unreasonable, not
so much because manufacture is profitable to those who carry it on, but because it is believed
that the whole community benefits by it.").
52. Id.
53. Id. § 291 cmt. e.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. The Restatement also fails to provide concrete examples of how the reasonable person
makes risk-utility judgments. It offers not a single illustration (other than the easy cases re-
ferred to in some of the comments) of how the risk-utility balancing approach works. Ve learn.
for example, that driving a car extremely fast is justified only by an errand "of great importance
such as the extinguishment of fire or the saving of human life.' Id. § 293 cmt. b. Contrast this
with § 289's elaborately detailed treatment of which risks an actor should be expected to recog-




to the great majority of interests is identical with the value which
popular opinion attaches to them," while adding that there are
some interests to which "a persistent course of decisions has, ex-
pressly or by implication, attached a value different from that
which the jury would ordinarily attach thereto."57 Where such a
conflict is present, the Restatement asserts that "the legal and not
the popular valuation" controls. 58
The Restatement's thesis that legal and popular valuations
are usually identical is important for two reasons. First, this "con-
vergence" thesis, if correct, suggests that the Restatement's failure
to explain how free-standing legal valuation works may not matter
very much. Given the jury's traditional role in applying the negli-
gence standard, in most situations there will be no judicial deci-
sions specifying the social value of particularly described
interests.59 As a practical matter, therefore, the best way to ascer-
tain what social value the law attaches to an interest will usually
be to consult popular opinion. Second, the Restatement essentially
equates the value public opinion attaches to an interest with the
value the average jury would attach to it. This suggests that the
real meaning of the "social value" criterion for balancing costs and
benefits depends on the extent to which courts police jury evalua-
tions of the Hand Factors. 60 As I will next explore, these themes
were indeed prominent in the thinking of the scholars who had the
greatest influence on the Restatement (First).
57. Id. § 292 cmt. b.
58. Id. On the other hand, the Restatement also suggests that when the legal valuation di-
verges from "a persistent and long-continued course of public conviction, as distinguished from a
novel and possibly ephemeral opinion, courts should and often do re-examine their valuation and
make it conform to the settled popular opinion." Id. § 291 cmt. d.
59. There may be broad language in opinions about the importance of this or that general
interest, but it is hard to see how such generalities could be of much help in evaluating concrete
factual situations. Consider, for example, the Eckert court's statement that "[t]he law has so
high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it, unless
made under such circumstances as to constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons."
Eckert v. Lang Island R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
60. It may be fruitful to think of the Restatement's references to the legal valuation of inter.
ests as designed to legitimize a particular type of jury control. The Restatement suggests that
courts are warranted in overriding jury decisions they think are at odds with the law's valuation
of the affected interests. And its use of activity-level examples suggests that courts should be
most willing to intervene when the claim the jury is considering is that an entire activity is un-
reasonably risky even if carefully conducted.
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D. Seavey's Moral Conception of Negligence and the
Restatement (First)
As we have seen, the Restatement (First) incorporates risk-
utility analysis into the impartial decisionmaking of the reasonable
person and further posits that the reasonable person's judgments
about risk and utility should be based on the values public opinion
assigns to different interests. But why should the values that hap-
pen to prevail in the community be given this normative signifi-
cance? An important article by Warren Seavey, written during the
formative years of the Restatement (First) for use by Bohlen and the
scholars collaborating with him, sheds considerable light on how
Bohlen's circle viewed these matters. 61
Seavey was primarily interested in investigating the extent
to which the standard for negligence took into account the actor's
"subjective" characteristics rather than "objective" characteristics
supplied by law. He divided human qualities into physical, mental,
and-most important for present purposes-moral. The gist of his
position was that the reasonable man was endowed by law with the
individual actor's physical qualities, but with "standard moral and
at least average mental qualities .... '"62 Within the realm of mental
qualities, Seavey endorsed Terry's position that an actor was not
liable unless the risk was both foreseeable and unreasonable, bor-
rowed Terry's five-factor balancing approach, and incorporated it
into the deliberations of the reasonable person.63 But Seavey de-
parted from Terry's approach in two important ways. First, whereas
Terry had commingled the factual and evaluative dimensions of
risk-utility, Seavey sharply distinguished between them. Second,
Seavey expressly tied the reasonable person's evaluation of the
Hand Factors to the reasonable person's standard moral qualities:
In this computation there are invoked two distinct kinds of problems. The first is
purely mathematical, namely the ascertainment of the degree of likelihood that
certain events will or will not occur. As to this, the result would be the same under
any system of law; it is achieved by purely intellectual processes. The complete an-
swer can be obtained, however, only by solving the other type of problem, that is
the comparative values of the conflicting interests of the actor and the one whose
interests are threatened. This evaluation calls for the so.called moral qualities. To
the extent that the solution of these problems involves standardized elements, or,
61. Warren A. Seavey, Negligence-Subjectice or Objcctive?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 n.1
(1927).
62. Id. at 27.
63. Seavey qualified his endorsement of Terry's position in a long footnote asserting "[w]e
must not assume that we can rely upon any formula in regard to 'balancing interests' to solve
negligence cases. The phrase is only a convenient one to indicate factors which may be consid-
ered and should not connote any mathematical correspondence." Id. at 8 n.7.
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phrasing it differently, to the extent that the actor's conduct is determined with
reference to the community valuations, we may say that an objective test applies54
But why does Seavey think that moral qualities are needed
to evaluate interests? Because he thinks one of our two basic moral
qualities is "the ability to evaluate interests; or, to put it in accord
with the classical statement, the ability to distinguish right from
wrong.165 The reasonable person is endowed with the "standard mo-
rality," that is, the standard ability to evaluate interests, and there-
fore "evaluates interests in accordance with the valuation placed
upon them by the community sentiment crystallized into law."66 On
this view, the reasonable person both assesses the Hand Factors
accurately and evaluates the competing interests in accord with the
prevailing moral views of their relative value.
Like Seavey, the Restatement (First) endows the reasonable
person with normal morality: "[T]he judgment of the actor ... must
conform to the standard of a reasonable man, neither more nor less.
He is not excused because he is peculiarly inconsiderate of others or
reckless of his own safety nor is he negligent if his moral or social
conscience is so sensitive that he regards as improper conduct
which a reasonable man would regard as proper."6 7 Also like Sea-
vey, the Restatement links that normal moral character to the risk-
utility test. It does so by requiring that the reasonable person's
judgments about risks "give to the respective interests concerned
the value which the law attaches to them," and "give an impartial
consideration to the harm likely to be done the interests of the
other as compared with the advantages likely to accrue to his own
interests."6 This combination of knowledge of what is socially val-
ued and equal respect for others constitutes the Restatement
(First)'s version of Seavey's standard morality.69
The Restatement's claim that reasonable persons balance
risk and utility is thus embedded in an overall conception of ethical
decisionmaking in situations where one's own interests conflict
64. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 3. The other fundamental moral quality he identifies is the will.
66. Id. at 10.
67. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 291 cmt. c. Cf. Seavey, supra note 61, at 11 ("Exces-
sive altruism is as much a departure from the standard morality as excessive selfishness, al-
though in practice it is seldom actionable.").
68. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. d (explaining that the reasonable person
is "reasonably 'considerate' of the safety of others and does not look primarily to his own advan.
tage").
69. For a contemporary account of negligence drawing on the ethical idea of the Golden




with the safety of others. Indeed, the Restatement does not claim
that a reasonable person always balances risk and utility by en-
gaging in a free-standing inquiry into the Hand Factors. Rather,
the reasonable person is guided by a moral sense that tracks the
comparative judgments about the relative value of interests that
most people in the community would make.
By grounding the reasonable person's value judgments in the
standard or normal morality of the community, Seavey and the Re-
statement (First) elevate community norms to the status of law.
Seavey justifies this move on the grounds that the values of con-
flicting interests have somehow been "fixed by the community" and
"crystallized into law." That assertion, however, seems no more per-
suasive than the Restatement (First)'s parallel claim that the rea-
sonable person is guided by the social values attached by "the law"
to conflicting interests. Unless we expand what we mean by "law"
beyond judge-made or statute law and include informal but widely
shared community norms, these arguments are descriptively un-
tenable.
Such an expansion may be exactly what Seavey and the Re-
statement (First) ultimately have in mind. On Seavey's view, the
common law sets up the standard of a reasonable person who is en-
dowed with the "standard morality," and who therefore knows the
prevailing values of the community and applies them in regulating
his own conduct. Actors cannot complain that they should not be
held to this standard because they can fairly be expected to be fa-
miliar with prevailing community values,70 and because the com-
mon law has chosen to treat them as authoritative. Moreover, this
account helps buttress the traditional role of the jury in determin-
ing negligence. Jurors can safely be presumed to be familiar with
70. In this connection, it is noteworthy that Seavey was concerned ith showing that the
law was consistent with "our sense of justice." Seavey, supra note 62, at 12. Many people's sense
of justice would be offended, however, if the rule were that each person is expected to act in ac-
cordance with whatever values happen to prevail in the community--even if those values have
no legal provenance. Freedom of conscience might thereby be thought subordinated to popular
opinion. But if the prevailing values of the community are treated as already part of the law-
because the common law chooses to treat them as authoritative-then one can argue, as Seavey
does, that "[t]o permit one who knows but does not accede to the community valuation of inter-
ests to have an individual standard would at once destroy the law. Id. at 11. Cf. Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to neutral, gener-
ally applicable laws that conflict with an individual's religious beliefs, on the grounds that this
would be "permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself "); see also Rey-
nolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879) (CCan a man excuse his [unlawful] practices
... because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of




prevailing community values. Beyond that, in consulting commu-
nity values, the jury would in an important sense be applying the
"law" because the common law has designated those values as part
of the reasonable person standard.
This argument meshes with the Restatement (First)'s for-
mulations. Recall the Restatement (First)'s position that the reason-
able person standard "may be established by a legislative enact-
ment or a judicial decision," or "may be applied to the facts of the
case by the trial judge or the jury, if there be no such legislative
enactment or judicial decision."71 These formulations treat legisla-
tures and appellate courts as lawmakers, while treating trial courts
and juries as law-appliers. Obviously, insofar as the negligence
standard is not fully defined or specified, the law cannot simply be
applied. By establishing popular valuations as controlling for pur-
poses of the risk-utility test, however, the Restatement can be seen
as giving those informal social norms the force of law.
Now, you may think this solution to the Restatement (First)'s
fiction that interests have "social values" that have already been
"attached" to them by "law" rests on an equally fictitious idea-that
there are well-defined popular valuations for the interests at stake.
I agree that there are serious questions here. 2 But I am trying to
describe-not defend-an approach to the reasonable person stan-
dard that cuts across the lines of contemporary negligence scholar-
ship in an interesting way. On one side are the partisans of the
Hand Formula; on the other are those, like Patrick Kelley, who ar-
gue that community norms are the bedrock for the reasonable per-
son. The evidence I have presented suggests that this dichotomy is
overdrawn. The approach taken by Seavey and the Restatement
(First) combines the reasonable person, the norm of equal respect
for the interests of others, the analytic technique of the Hand For-
mula, and reliance on community valuations of the conflicting in-
terests of potential injurers and victims. At least superficially, the
result is an appealingly pluralist conception of negligence. Whether
it is in the end coherent or descriptively adequate is a different
question.
71. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 285 (emphasis added).
72. These issues are ably explored by Professor Abraham in his contribution to this Confer-
ence. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1187 (2001).
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E. Bohlen's View of the Roles of Court and Jury in Determining
Negligence
One of the crucial questions for any version of Hand Formula
balancing is whether, and if so how, the judge should instruct the
jury to apply it. How one answers that question obviously depends
on one's position on the respective roles of judge and jury in deter-
mining the negligence standard. Francis Bohlen staked out his po-
sition on these issues in an article written in 1924 (that is, early in
the development of the Restatement (First)).73 Bohlen took the jury's
application of the negligence standard to the facts of the case to be
the paradigmatic example of a "mixed question of law and fact."74
He suggested that this label reflected the "peculiar nature" of the
jury's function in deciding "questions for the solution of which the
law has declared no definite pre-existing rule."75 The law cannot
formulate definite standards in advance to govern the innumerable
specific cases that might arise. The best the law can do is "an-
nounce broad general principles, which give the materials and gen-
eral directions for the construction of the standard to be applied in
each specific case."
76
In negligence cases, Bohlen (following Terry) took the rele-
vant general principle to be that the defendant is negligent if "a
'reasonable man' in the defendant's place would have realized that
his conduct would unduly imperil the plaintiff's interests" 7 7 Moreo-
ver, he accepted Terry's argument that the negligence question, so
understood, would be "purely one of fact" if it entailed an inquiry
into "the average conduct of mankind under similar
circumstances."78 Yet, Bohlen rejected Terry's conclusion that juries
were merely finding facts when they applied the negligence stan-
73. Francis A. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fac, 72 U. PA. L REV. 111 (1924).
74. Id. at 112.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 113.
77. Id.
78. Id. Terry argued that the issue of negligence turns on what "a standard man," not "an
ideal or perfect man, but an ordinary member of the community," would have done under the
circumstances. Terry, supra note 37, at 47. Questions of negligence are left to the jury "because
the jury is supposed to consist of standard men, and therefore to know of their owm knowledge
how such a man would act in a given situation." Id. Moreover, Terry thought this the more ap-
propriate standard because these are questions of fact: "the inference of reasonableness or un-
reasonableness, of due care or negligence, is in its nature one of fact, the data furnishing the
minor premise and the major premise being drawn from common experience [i.e., the jury's
knowledge of how an ordinary person would act], whereas in a true inference of law the major
premise is a rule of law.' Id. at 50.
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dard, denying Terry's premise that the reasonable person is an or-
dinary or average person:
[Tihe 'reasonable man' is not the average man. He is an ideal creature, expressing
public opinion declared by its accredited spokesman, whether court or jury, as to
what ought to be done under the circumstances by a man, who is not so engrossed
in his own affairs as to disregard the effect of his conduct upon the interests of
others. He may be called a personification of the court or jury's social judgment.
The factor controlling the judgment of the defendant's conduct is not what is, but
what ought to be.
79
These social judgments, Bohlen maintained, were "more
nearly akin to a declaration of law than to a finding of fact," be-
cause they created obligatory standards used to determine the
rights and liabilities of the parties.80 On the other hand, because
the jury's judgment applies only to the particular case before it,
Bohlen pointed out that it was not lawmaking in the strong sense of
laying down a rule to govern all cognate cases in the future.81 He
was thus led to a surprising conclusion: that the jury's function in
defining the standard of conduct was neither factfinding nor law-
making, but should instead be "properly termed 'administrative,' 
because it was necessary to the "administration of the pre-existing
broadly stated law by making it capable of application to the facts
of specific litigated cases."
82
Bohlen used his "administrative" characterization of the
evaluation of negligence as the foundation for some large claims
about the respective roles of court and jury. He argued that case-by-
case jury determination of the standard of conduct raises serious
questions of fairness, consistency, and predictability. The difficulty,
he suggested, stems from "the fact that the common law has no ma-
chinery, like the legislatively created administrative board, which
79. Bohlen, supra note 73, at 113 (emphasis in original). It is not easy to know who is right
here. If the law calls for an inquiry into the average person's values, or even into the prevailing
values in the community, it seems right to characterize this inquiry as factual. Facts about the
values people hold are still facts. There is some support for the view that courts embraced this
rationale at the time of the Restatement (First). See FRANCESCO PARIsI, LIABILITY FOR
NEGLIGENCE AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION 226-27 (2d ed. 1992) (suggesting that American courts at
the turn of the century tended to define negligence in terms of the care the average person would
take). On the other hand, the idea that the reasonable person impartially balances conflicting
interests seems more normative than descriptive, because many (if not most) people fail to con-
form to that standard in their daily lives. In the end, I am inclined to agree with Bohlen, be-
cause I think most juries approach their task by asking how a reasonable person should behave
rather than how an average or ordinary person would behave. See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL
BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 104-11 (2000) (presenting evidence that
jurors try to do "total justice" between the litigants).
80. Bohlen, supra note 74, at 114.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 115.
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can make rulings reducing general rules to that particularity neces-
sary for their application to individual cases," and which can re-
examine those rulings periodically "to determine whether they are
still valid in view of changed conditions and changed public opinion
as to the value of the respective interests."' s
His solution to this problem had two components. First,
Bohlen suggested that courts should (and already did) exercise far
greater control over the jury's determination of standards of con-
duct than they do over its findings of fact. 4 One might have ex-
pected him to make the Holmesian argument that courts, as repeat
players who acquire experience and give reasons for their decisions,
are better placed than juries to render these administrative judg-
ments.85 Instead, Bohlen argued that juries cannot be trusted to
weigh utility against risk. Bohlen claimed that juries, moved by the
plaintiffs injuries and the defendant's wealth, will often employ a
de facto norm of strict liability.86 Even if the jury did apply the rea-
sonable person standard, he suggested that it would give scant
weight to the utility of the defendant's conduct in light of its injuri-
ous consequences. Courts could appropriately intervene to override
"the jury's insistence on an overly stringent standard of conduct."87
Second, Bohlen believed appellate courts needed prodding to
intervene even more aggressively than they were accustomed to in
jury determinations. He believed they were held back, not by defer-
ence to the jury, but by fear that the rules they announced would be
impervious to change. The culprit was stare decisis. Bohlen argued
that it was out of place here. Courts, he wrote, should not apply
"the traditional view that a judicial ruling on any subject an-
nounces a principle of law fixed, permanent, and immutable" to ju-
dicial decisions defining the negligence standardS8 Defining negli-
gence is not a matter of declaring unchanging common-law princi-
83. Id. at 117.
84. Id. at 117-18.
85. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 123-24 (1881).
86. Bohlen, supra note 73, at 118 (The general utility of such conduct is not likely to re-
ceive much consideration from a jury who sees before them a plaintiff whose vital interests have
been harmed by a particular instance of it. A court might emphasize to the jury ad nauseam the
social value of the act, but the jury would only see one man injured by another. And only the
most confirmed optimist would dare to hope that they would judge the defendants conduct by
what that ideal creature, the 'reasonable man' would do .... The concept universal among all
primitive men, that an injury should be paid for by him who causes it, irrespective of the moral
or social quality of his conduct, while it has disappeared from legal thought, still dominates the
opinion of the sort of men who form the average jury.").
87. Id. at 119.
88. Id. at 116.
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ples, but rather of administrative specification of a standard of con-
duct that is dependent on changing social values. 89
How can Bohlen's belief that juries frequently ignore the
utility of the defendant's conduct be reconciled with his adoption of
a risk-utility test in the Restatement (First)-particularly one that
relies heavily on popular valuation of interests? Isn't this just in-
viting juries to hold defendants to a standard approaching strict
liability, exactly as Bohlen feared?
The fullest statement of Bohlen's views on these issues is
contained in the Reporter's Commentary he wrote to accompany the
1929 Tentative Draft of the Restatement (First)'s provisions on neg-
ligence. Generally speaking, these Draft provisions were substan-
tively equivalent to the final text of the Restatement (First). All the
key features-the overarching reasonable person standard, the un-
reasonable risk test, the use of risk-utility analysis, and the resort
to social values to determine the weight of the interests to be bal-
anced-were in place (as was most of the specific wording). In com-
menting on these provisions, Bohlen made three key points. First,
he acknowledged that adopting risk-utility analysis represented a
shift in the formal doctrinal test for negligence. 90 Second, he argued
that this shift would not hinder the courts in policing jury decisions
applying the negligence standard: "there is no reason why the
courts should not exercise the same control over the jury's exercise
of its discretion in determining the relative values of the interests
concerned and in otherwise comparing the risk with the utility,
which they now exercise in controlling the jury's application of the
more usual and general formula of 'the conduct of a reasonable man
under the surrounding circumstances.' "91 Third, he urged courts to
modify their reasonable-person instructions to juries: "the Reporter
can see no danger and some hope of gain in calling to the jury's at-
tention the fact that their judgment should be controlled not merely
as to what a reasonable man would do, but as to what a reasonable
man would do with his attention centered upon the risk which his
conduct involves and the gain to society or to himself, and through
himself to society, which is likely to result from his conduct."
92
89. Id. at 119-20.
90. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, Commentary on Section 172, Tentative Draft No. 4
("The comparison between the social utility of the act and the magnitude of the risk is occasion.





Plainly, an important part of Bohlen's motivation for incor-
porating risk-utility analysis into the reasonable person standard
was to both reinforce the ability of courts to oversee jury determina-
tions of the negligence standard, and to facilitate the judicial adop-
tion of reasonable-person instructions that directed juries to refer
to the Hand Factors in their deliberations. Bohlen believed that ju-
ries could apply the Hand Factors and evaluate them in terms of
popular valuation of interests. The problem was to get them to do
so, to overcome their tendencies to be swayed by sympathy for the
victim, by hindsight, and by the pull of strict liability intuitions.
The solution was to ask the jury to imagine how a reasonable per-
son would have behaved-and then give them a reasonable person
who (1) balances interests impartially, (2) looks at all the relevant
consequences, and (3) relies on prevailing community values in as-
sessing both sides of the ledger. And if that didn't work? Well,
making risk-utility part of the black letter law would tend to
strengthen appellate oversight of jury verdicts in negligence cases
because it would give courts a structure for picking apart one-sided
verdicts.
F. The Restatement (First)'s Agenda for Changing Negligence Law
As we have seen, the Restatement (First) broke new ground
in making cost-benefit analysis an important and explicit part of
determining negligence. For that very reason, some would deny
that the Restatement faithfully reflects the character of American
negligence law at the time of its adoption. Michael Green has
documented the paucity of negligence case law explicitly endorsing
cost-benefit or risk-utility balancing as of the adoption of the Re-
statement (First) in 1934.93 Bohlen anticipated that objection in his
1929 Reporter's Commentary. His reply was that "[w]hile the com-
parison between the utility of an act and the risk involved therein
is rarely stated by courts as the basis of their decisions, in reality it
is the underlying basis of substantially all of them."94 (Compare
Posner's famous claim for the Hand Formula: "it never purported to
be original but was an attempt to make explicit the standard that
the courts had long applied.")95
93. Green, supra note 4, at 1611.
94. Id. at 1625.
95. Posner, supra note 11, at 32.
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Now, making explicit what is implicit in the case law means
changing the reasons that courts relying on the Restatement will
give in the future, and therefore calls for a judgment about how far
a Restatement should go in reforming the law. Unquestionably,
most torts scholars-and most judges-would agree that making
the law clearer and more explicit is an entirely appropriate goal for
a Restatement of torts. What is more controversial is whether Boh-
len was correct in claiming that risk-utility balancing is the best
(most explanatory, most predictive, most coherent) account of the
decisions. At its most general, Bohlen's claim was simply that
courts usually decide negligence on the basis of pragmatic, all-
things-considered, consequentialist judgments. Although some
would reject even that "big tent" formulation, it seems fairly clear
that most torts scholars today subscribe to it.
But what about the objection that the subsequent decisions
employing risk-utility language in reliance on the Restatements
should be given relatively little weight because they mostly reflect
the ideas of certain legal academics rather than the real traditions
of the common law? 96 The first response is that academic ideas have
always been part of the spectrum of legal opinion on which Re-
statements draw, and appropriately so. Beyond that, the subsequent
acceptance of risk-utility analysis in appellate decisions suggests
that Bohlen was correct in claiming that the risk-utility gloss on
the reasonable person standard merely made explicit what courts
were already thinking and doing.
97
It also bears emphasizing that the Restatement (First) did
not purport to replace the reasonable person standard with risk-
utility analysis. That would have been a radically revisionist move,
clearly inconsistent with the ALI's conception of its Restatements as
primarily rationalizing the law rather than reforming it. Far from
discarding the reasonable person standard, the Restatement used it
to tie together the various strands of substantive negligence doc-
trine. This was plainly an effort to make negligence law more sys-
tematic and coherent, while remaining consistent with the case law.
The Restatement's incorporation of risk-utility balancing into its
96. Interestingly, almost no one makes that argument about Section 402 of the Restatement
(Second), even though the main impetus for Section 402 was the ALI rather than the courts, and
even though Section 402 surely was instrumental in the development of modern products liabil-
ity law.
97. The ALI's endorsement carries some weight as well, because it suggests widespread
agreement among academics, judges, and practitioners that the reasonable person standard
includes a balancing test.
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account of the reasonable person's decisionmaking should be seen
as cut from the same incrementalist cloth. Risk-utility analysis,
tied to prevailing social values and to the ideal of equal considera-
tion for the interests of others, and presented as part of a reason-
able person's decisionmaking, was an attempt to rationalize negli-
gence law, not revolutionize it.
To be sure, by endorsing a pragmatic, balancing approach to
evaluating reasonable care, the Restatement (First) was to some
extent taking sides in a debate that torts theorists are still carrying
on. Yet, it would be a vast overstatement to say that the Restate-
ment (First)'s consequentialism is reductionist or monistic. As we
have seen, Bohlen and Seavey believed negligence law should give
individuals fair warning of the standards to which they were held,
should be grounded in the social values and mores of the commu-
nity, should express ethical norms of impartiality and consideration
for others, and should employ standards that juries could and
would competently and faithfully follow. The Restatement (First)'s
approach to the meaning of negligence is at every turn influenced
by awareness that negligence is an ethically charged common-law
standard to be administered by courts and applied by juries in indi-
vidual cases brought by injured plaintiffs against causally respon-
sible defendants. As such, the Restatement (First) seems quite sen-
sitive to the importance of many of the structural and institutional
features of tort law that corrective justice theorists have stressed.93
Indeed, Michael Green has suggested that Bohlen's balanc-
ing approach can be seen as largely "divorced from welfare maxi-
mizing," and that it was on that understanding that the American
Law Institute ultimately approved the Restatement (First). Insofar
as Professor Green means that the Restatement (First)'s risk-utility
approach is not equivalent to Posner's wealth-maximization inter-
pretation of the Hand Formula, I entirely agree. For Posner, unlike
for the Restatement, the reasonable person is a superfluous and ves-
tigial distraction from the real business at hand-determining who
would have been willing to pay more, the victim (to avoid being in-
jured) or the injurer (to avoid the burden of greater care). Cost-
benefit analysis for Posner is not merely an aspect of the reasonable
person's decisionmaking, as the Restatement would have it; it is the
template that supplies the unifying structure to the entire negli-
98. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, YALE LJ. 1233 (1988); Benjamin
Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L REV. 1 (1998) (develop-




gence inquiry. And while both approaches go beyond simply calling
for a factual focus on the Hand Formula factors and provide a met-
ric for evaluating those factors, those metrics are very different: the
values attached by law (and public opinion) to the interests of vic-
tims and injurers are not determined by asking what people are
willing to pay to protect those interests.
On the other hand, if Green means that the Restatement is
"divorced from welfare maximizing" in the welfare-economic
sense, 99 I am inclined to disagree. Granted, the Restatement does
not make the case for risk-utility balancing in overtly instrumen-
talist terms. There is no claim, for example, that risk-utility bal-
ancing will reliably give actors incentives to take welfare-
maximizing precautions. The emphasis of the Restatement is rather
on the proposition that a reasonable person is one whose delibera-
tions and values lead him to take welfare-maximizing precautions.
The Restatement seems to envision, then, that negligence law con-
tributes to welfare-maximizing behavior by expressing and rein-
forcing a widely-held moral conception of how people ought to be-
have toward each other. But this focus on the good (reasonably pru-
dent) person-rather than the Holmesian "bad man"-hardly
amounts to rejection of the behaviorist proposition that fear of tort
liability may induce some persons to behave in welfare-maximizing
ways.
III. THE RESTATEMENT (FIRST) AND THE HAND FORMULA
The Restatement (First)'s approach to negligence has met
with uneven success. At the trial level, the jury is instructed to de-
termine negligence by deciding how a reasonable person would have
behaved under the circumstances, but is typically given no further
instructions about how to approach that task. 100 Thus, the jury is
neither told to focus on the Hand Factors nor to evaluate those fac-
tors in any particular way. Insofar as one of Bohlen's objectives was
to change jury instructions so that they called the jury's attention
to the Hand Factors and the need for evaluating them, the Restate-
ment (First) must be accounted a failure.
99. For an extended defense of social welfare as the criterion for public policy evaluation,
see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS VERSUS HUMAN WELFARE: ON
THE EVALUATION OF LEGAL POLICY (HLS Law-Economics Disc. Paper No. 277, 2000), available at
Social Science Research Network Electronic Database, www.ssrn.com.
100. See Gilles, supra note 7, at 1016-19. The practice is otherwise in product liability design
defect cases, where courts routinely give risk-utility instructions. See id.
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At the doctrinal level, it is a different story. Many state
courts have used or adapted the Restatement's risk-utility provi-
sions, and many others have employed some other version of cost-
benefit balancing. And, as Michael Green suggests, the Restatement
(First) may have influenced Hand's decision to propose the Hand
Formula for the first time in Gunnarson in 1938.101 The Hand For-
mula's influence on appellate decisions, of course, has been consid-
erable-though not nearly as great as its influence on torts scholar-
ship.
But are the Restatement (First) and Hand Formula ap-
proaches virtual twins or distant relatives? Did Learned Hand
mean to endorse the Restatement's approach, or to propose a Pos-
nerian alternative to it? The Learned Hand opinions I shall now
discuss strongly suggest that (1) the Hand Formula was a rework-
ing and clarification of (not a break with) the Restatement's risk-
utility analysis; (2) that Hand (like Bohlen) thought the evaluation
of the Hand Factors involved a kind of lawmaking that was never-
theless for the jury in the first instance; and (3) that Hand would
have thought it clear that juries should receive Hand Formula in-
structions.
That leaves one nagging question unanswered: what did
Hand envision as the role of the reasonable person standard, and
what was its relationship to the Hand Formula? There is no indica-
tion that Hand was hostile to the reasonable person standard. The
fact remains that the Hand Formula, as stated, stands on its own in
the sense that it is not presented as part of the reasonable person
standard. In that respect, the Hand Formula diverges sharply from
the Restatement approach. The apparent self-sufficiency of the
Hand Formula, I shall suggest, may be one reason why Richard
Posner chose the Hand Formula-and not the Restatement ap-
proach-as the linchpin of his economic interpretation of negli-
gence.102
101. Green, supra note 4, at 1629. ("Bohlen's articulation of a risk-benefit test in the Re-
statement not only provides support for the positive economic theory of negligence, but it also
appears to have provided the impetus for Learned Hand to state his version of a risk-benefit test,
first in Gunnarson v. Robert Jacob, Inc., four years after the Restatement (First) of Torts was
published, and then again nine years after Gunnarson in Carroll Towing."). As Green points out,
Hand was deeply involved in the ALrs work as a member of its Council and actively reviewed
drafts of the various Restateements. Apparently, however, Hand had a policy against citing Re-
statements in his opinions. Id.
102. The greater clarity and simplicity of the Hand Formula is another.
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A. The Hand Formula and the Risk-Utility Test
We saw in Part II that Terry's five-factor test, the Restate.
ment (First)'s risk-utility factors, and the Hand Formula are
equivalent in the sense that they all direct attention to the same
potential advantages and disadvantages of an actor's conduct: the
probability it will cause harm, the seriousness of that harm, and,
weighed against these, the advantages of acting in this way. In an-
other respect, however, the Hand Formula marks an important
practical improvement on the Restatement's risk-utility analysis. To
see this, consider the Hand Formula and the risk-utility test in
isolation (that is, ignoring the other features of the Restatement ap-
proach). The question under the Restatement is whether the acci-
dent risk associated with the challenged conduct is greater than the
utility of running it. The question under the Hand Formula ap-
proach is whether the burden of precautions is greater than the ex-
pected accident loss. These formulations are consistent with each
other, but they implicitly work off different paradigms for conse-
quentialist balancing in negligence law. For the Restatement (First),
the paradigm involves activity-level choices: an actor engages in a
useful activity that might harm others, and the question for deci-
sion is whether this conduct-even if carefully carried on-is negli-
gent. For the Hand Formula, the paradigm involves care-level
choices: an actor omits a precaution that might avoid harm to oth-
ers, and the question for decision is whether this omission is negli-
gent. Both approaches can, without undue difficulty, be extended to
the other dimension of decisionmaking: someone applying the Re-
statement approach can ask how much utility would have been lost,
and how much risk avoided, had the activity been modified by tak-
ing an additional precaution, 0 3 and someone applying the Hand
Formula approach can treat "refraining from the activity" as the
relevant precaution to be evaluated. Nevertheless, it is clear that
(for a variety of reasons) that care-level choices are litigated far
more often than activity-level choices.104 In that respect, the Hand
103. Fleming James, for example, wrote: "Outside the fields of illegal enterprise and of strict
liability, the interest whose sacrifice is in question on the issue of negligence is the value of the
particular act or omission which is challenged as negligent. Looked at another way, it is the
burden of refraining from that particular act or of taking an effective precaution to cover that
particular omission. It is not the value of the enterprise or activity as a whole, or the detriment
that would flow from its abandonment." Fleming James, Jr., Nature of Negligence, 3 UTAH L.
REV. 275, 284 (1953).
104. The salience of activity-level negligence in Bohlen's account of the law's implicit reliance
on risk-utility analysis may have stemmed from the then-existing state of precedent. In his
commentary on the 1929 Tentative Draft, Bohlen argued that "courts have from the earliest
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Formula has the advantage of being adapted to analysis of what is
practically the more important type of negligence claim. 105
B. Applying the Negligence Standard: Legislation Writ Small
Obviously, the Hand Formula did not purport to change the
jury's historic factfinding role. In negligence cases, the jury finds P,
L, and B. Beyond that, however, Learned Hand's opinions affirm
that the evaluation of the Hand Factors is for the jury, not the
judge. In Conway v. O'Brien, for example, he wrote of the Hand
Formula that "a solution always involves some preference, or choice
between incommensurables, and it is consigned to a jury because
their decision is thought most likely to accord with commonly ac-
cepted standards, real or fancied." 106
Hand also agreed with Bohlen that the jury's role in deter-
mining negligence involved a form of law-making, and with Seavey
that this law-making would be unfair unless grounded in commu-
nity standards accessible to all. In Stornelli v. United States Gyp-
sum, he wrote:
times considered the comparison between the utility of the defendant's structure or use as com-
pared with the harm that it does his neighbor as decisive." RESTATFMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS,
Commentary on Section 172, at 5. By contrast, he acknowledged that "[t]he comparison between
the social utility of the act and the magnitude of the risk involved in it is occasionally, but only
occasionally, stated as the basis of decision in negligence cases." Id. To be sure, Bohlen went on
to discuss several such decisions. But his main argument that the courts implicitly balance risk
and utility was an inference from the legal proposition that "it is not negligence to carry on
[risky] activities so long as reasonable care is taken to keep the risk within the irreducible mini-
mum inherent thereto." Id. at 7. In other words, Bohlen reasoned that courts must be balancing
the risk and utility of particular activities, because otherwise actors would routinely be held
liable for engaging in activities that involved foreseeable risks of injury to others.
105. The shift from balancing the risk and utility of conduct to balancing the costs and bene-
fits of precautions may have another implication that leads us back to the role of the jury. Boh-
len claimed that in the common law of torts, "[c]onsciously or unconsciously account is taken of
every individual's interest in free choice of his activities." Id. This interest is not as conspicuous
when the issue is framed as whether the expense and inconvenience of taking a precaution justi-
fies omitting it. I am well aware that conventional economic analysis would regard this as a
distinction without a difference. But I am talking now about the rhetoric of the negligence stan-
dard and about how that standard is communicated to the jury. Risk-utility analysis invites us
to picture the actor engaging in some useful, worthwhile activity that involves a risk to others,
and then to ask whether a reasonable person would have acted more carefully--or whether doing
so would have interfered unduly with that valuable activity. Hand Formula analysis invites us
to focus on some precaution that promises to reduce risks to others, and to ask whether a rea-
sonable person would have found the costs of taking this precaution excessive despite its safety
benefits. If I were a plaintiffs lawyer forced to choose between jury instructions setting forth
these two instructions, I would take the Hand Formula, because it casts the defendant in the role
of penny-pincher, whereas risk-utility analysis presents the defendant in context-as doing
something good that might be seriously hindered were too much in the way of precautions de-
manded.
106. Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940).
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It is true that we think of that common-law duty as though it were imposed before
the event, because it demands only 'reasonable' care; but that does not specify the
conduct required and creates a duty incapable of being known in advance, and it is
ascertained and imposed only retroactively. Our excuse is that it is fair to exact
conformity to such a standard because it should be the inherited portion of the ac-
tor; although never formulated before-being measured by a unique occasion-he
will divine it by intuition. Nor is it derived alone from forecasting the probable
course of events, though that enters into it. It involves a matching of human inter-
ests: it is 'legislation' in parvo [in little]. 107
Beyond that, Hand saw the jury's function in determining
negligence as paradigmatic of a general tendency in the law. When-
ever the legal test turns on what conduct is reasonable, Hand
thought a "mixed question" was presented-a question of balancing
interests that was typically left to juries or to administrative agen-
cies. Hand's clearest expression of this view came in an opinion re-
viewing an NLRB decision:
The question is what is often called a 'mixed question of law and fact'; and it is
true that it comprises, or should comprise, two quite different determinations: (1.)
what in fact will be the prejudice to the interests of the employer in allowing elec-
tioneering to go on during lunch hours, and what will be the benefit to the employ-
ees; and what will be his benefit and their prejudice in disallowing it; (2.) whether
the benefits shall prevail over the prejudice, or vice versa. The language of § 8 is
too indefinite to allow the tribunal which enforces it to avoid the second of these
inquiries; it is the same question that often arises in the law of torts: e.g. negli-
gence, trade-marks, unfair trade, indeed all questions which depend upon what
conduct is 'reasonable.' In all these the court balances the interests against each
other, and awards priority as seems to it just.08
In short, Hand's theory seems strikingly similar to the Re-
statement's: the question of reasonable conduct requires the tribu-
nal to balance conflicting interests as it thinks just, in light of
((commonly accepted standards."0 9 This is legislation writ small-
Bohlen's "administrative" lawmaking-and in negligence cases this
function belongs to the jury.110
107. Stornelli v. United States Gypsum Co., 134 F.2d 461, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1943).
108. Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 142 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1944).
109. Hand's position may be overstated. Mark Gergen argues that there are many other
places in the law (e.g., in contract law) where similar ideas involving reasonableness are not
given to the jury for case-by-case specification, but instead basically treated as questions of law.
Mark Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common Law, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (1999).
110. See also LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 105-06 (3d ed. 1960) ("There is no way
of saying beforehand exactly what each driver should do or should not, until all the circum-
stances of the particular case are known. The law leaves this open with the vague command to
each that he shall be careful. What being careful means, it does not try to say; it leaves that to
the judge, who happens in this case to be a jury of twelve persons, untrained in the law.").
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C. Should Juries Receive Hand Formula Instructions?
Should the jury be given a Hand Formula instruction? To my
knowledge, Hand never directly addressed this question. His
statement in Moisan that attempts to quantify the Hand Formula
"are illusory; and, if serviceable at all, are so only to center atten-
tion upon which one of the factors may be determinative in any
given situation," '111 however, hints that the court should instruct the
jury that it must find P, L, and B, so that it can decide which factor
or factors is "determinative."
This reasoning is confirmed by Hand's discussion of interest
balancing in United States v. Levine,112 a 1936 obscenity case. In a
remarkable passage that foreshadows both the Hand Formula's re-
sort to the mathematical language of "variables" and "functions"113
and Hand's concern with "incommensurable" interests in negligence
cases, he wrote:
As so often happens, the problem is to find a passable compromise between oppos-
ing interests, whose relative importance, like that of all social or personal values,
is incommensurable. We impose such a duty upon a jury, because the standard
they fix is likely to be an acceptable mesne, and because in such matters a mesne
most nearly satisfies the moral demands of the community. There can never be
constitutive principles for such judgments, or indeed more than cautions to avoid
the personal aberrations of the jurors. We mentioned some of these in United
States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses ... ; the work must be taken as a whole, its
merits weighed against its defects; if it is old, its accepted place in the arts must
be regarded; if new, the opinions of competent critics in published reviews or the
like may be considered; what counts is its effect not upon any particular class, but
upon all those whom it is likely to reach. Thus 'obscenity' is a function of many
variables, and the verdict of the jury is not the conclusion of a syllogism of which
they are to find only the minor premises, but really a small bit of legislation ad
hoc, like the standard of care." 4
This passage leaves little doubt that Hand thought juries in
obscenity cases should receive instructions setting out the "cau-
tions" and "variables" he mentions. What sense would it make to
turn the jury loose to legislate obscenity ad hoc without this guid-
ance? The same reasoning would seem to apply in negligence cases:
jurors in negligence cases should receive Hand Formula instruc-
111. Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949).
112. United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936).
113. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Possibly it brings
this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms").
114. Levine, 83 F.2d at 157 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Hand expressed a
similar idea as early as 1913, in another obscenity case. See United States v. Kennerley, 209 F.
119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) CIf letters must, like other kinds of conduct, be subject to the social
sense of what is right, it would seem that a jury should in each case establish the standard much
as they do in cases of negligence.").
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tions so that they can know what the law is and legislate based on
the law's criteria, rather than indulge their "personal aberrations."
D. Hand versus Posner
Levine also yields some insight into Hand's views on the
evaluation of the Hand Factors. For Hand, the "relative impor-
tance" of the "opposing interests" in negligence cases is "incommen-
surable."" 5 Hand agrees with the Restatement that balancing inter-
ests involves assessing the "social or personal values" of those in-
terests. 16 But whereas the Restatement seems to present social
value as the common metric for evaluating risk and utility, Hand
asserts that "social or personal values" are no less incommensura-
ble than "interests." 117 Moreover, Hand denies, in the strongest
terms, that there are "constitutive principles for such judgments."11 8
Yet he does not conclude that the whole business is therefore a mat-
ter of arbitrary will. Rather, he suggests that juries will fix an (un-
principled) standard that nevertheless supplies "an acceptable
mesne" that "satisfies the moral demands of the community."119
It seems all but impossible to reconcile Hand's position in
Levine with Richard Posner's wealth-maximization interpretation of
the Hand Formula. Hand thinks the Hand Formula sets up an
evaluation of interests by juries relying on their sense of incom-
mensurable social values. Posner thinks the Hand formula sets up a
comparison of monetized costs and benefits-and if actual moneti-
zation is not feasible, juries are supposed to use their intuitions
concerning relative willingness-to-pay.
Of course, the Hand Formula isn't inherently dependent on
Learned Hand's general views about the incommensurability of op-
posing interests. Nevertheless, Posner's choice of Carroll Towing
(rather than Moisan or Conway) to epitomize the Hand Formula
separated the Hand Formula from its roots in Hand's jurispru-
dence. Carroll Towing was an admiralty case-so there was no jury
in the picture. Hand's formulation of the Hand Formula in Carroll
Towing was algebraic, abstract, and devoid of any reference to the
need for evaluation of the Hand Factors. We have seen ample evi-
dence that Hand believed such an evaluation was necessary, and
that it was to be carried out by reference to community standards of







justice. But in an admiralty case those standards would be supplied
by the judges themselves, so there was no occasion to emphasize
that aspect.120 Nor did incommensurability loom large in Hand's
Carroll Towing opinion, because the case involved only property
damage. 121
E. The Hand Formula and the Reasonable Person Standard
I have found no suggestion in Hand's opinions that the Hand
Formula is meant to be a replacement for the reasonable person
standard. 22 By the same token, though, Hand never states that the
Hand Formula should be incorporated into the decisionmaking of
the reasonable person. 123 Hand's view may well have been that the
reasonable person standard was for juries, not for appellate courts,
who could turn directly to the Hand Formula as the test for "rea-
sonable care." Assuming (as argued above) that Hand would have
favored giving juries Hand Formula instructions, it remains unclear
how he would have squared those instructions with the reasonable
person instructions juries have traditionally received.
IV. THE DISCUSSION DRAFT'S BALANCING APPROACH
We are now in a position to compare the Discussion Draft's
approach to defining negligence with the Restatement (First)'s. As
we have seen, the Restatement (First) approach (1) uses the reason-
able person standard as the basic template, while incorporating the
Hand Formula factors into the decisionmaking of the reasonable
person, (2) specifies a general risk-utility approach to evaluating
the Hand Formula factors, and (3) aims to encourage courts to in-
struct the jury concerning the Hand Formula factors, but contains
no explicit admonition to that effect. As I read it, the Discussion
Draft significantly changes features (1) and (2), but not (3). Under
120. See Hardie v. New York Harbor Dry Dock Corp., 9 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1925) (Hand,
J.) ("Given the facts, it is true that [the jury has] a latitude in fixing the standard of care re-
quired. We recognize that we must not substitute our own, as we do in causes in the admiralty.
But here, too, there are limits, unless the jury is to be all in all.") (emphasis added).
121. Thanks to Michael Green for this suggestion. In contrast to Carroll Towing, Conway.
Moisan, and Gunnarson were all personal injury cases.
122. While I have done some computer-assisted searching, I have not attempted to read
every negligence opinion Hand wrote (let alone every one he joined).
123. In the only negligence case I have found in which Hand applied the reasonable person
standard on appeal, the question concerned whether a risk was too remote to demand anticipa-
tion, and Hand's discussion emphasized that this should have been left to the jury. Merchant v.




the Discussion Draft, (1) the Hand Formula, not the reasonable
person standard, constitutes the basic template for determining
negligence, although the reasonable person standard (which is
treated as consistent with, but independent of, the Hand Formula)
continues to be used in categories of cases in which use of the Hand
Formula would supposedly be awkward; (2) the Restatement's "so-
cial value" approach to evaluating the Hand factors is replaced by
an undefined "balancing" approach; and (3) in light of the Hand
Formula's primary role in determining negligence, the Draft appar-
ently envisions that courts will routinely instruct juries in the
Hand Factors (but does not expressly advise them to do so). I now
turn to a more detailed look at these key points of comparison.
A. The Roles of the Reasonable Person Standard and the Hand
Formula
Proposed Section 4 makes "reasonable care under all the cir-
cumstances" the test for negligence. It then explains that the
"[p]rimary factors to consider" in determining whether conduct was
reasonably careful are "the foreseeable likelihood that it will result
in harm, the foreseeable severity of the harm that may ensue, and
the burden that would be borne by the actor and others if the actor
takes precautions that eliminate or reduce the possibility of harm."
This formulation explicitly adopts the Hand Formula factors, rather
than the reasonable person, as the benchmark for determining rea-
sonable care.1 24
Having disappeared from the "black letter" text of the Dis-
cussion Draft, however, the reasonable person standard promptly
reappears in the comments to Section 4. Indeed, in one important
category of cases, the reasonable person standard is to be used in-
stead of the Hand Formula: according to Comment c, when the neg-
ligence alleged "consists mainly in the actor's inattentive failure to
advert to the risk, explicit consideration of the primary factors [i.e.,
the Hand Factors] may be awkward, and the actor's conduct can
best be evaluated by directly applying the standard of the reasona-
bly careful person." As Comment k explains, this means that the
124. To be sure, Comment a to Section 4 claims that "the 'reasonable care' standard for neg.
ligence is basically the same as a standard expressed in terms of the 'reasonably careful person'
(or the 'reasonably prudent person')," on the grounds that a reasonably careful person "acts with
reasonable care." But because Section 4 defines reasonable care in terms of the Hand Factors,
the real meaning of comment a is that the behavior of a reasonable person complies with the
Hand Formula. Comment a does not incorporate the Hand Formula into the decisionmaking of
the reasonable person, as the Restatement (First) did.
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trier of fact can "simply consider whether the reasonably careful
person would have been aware of the risk."25
The Discussion Draft's recognition that the Hand Formula is
more useful in some cases-and less useful in others-is a welcome
change from the Restatement (First)'s insistence that every case is
to be analyzed using the same conceptual framework. But let us ask
Seavey's question: what are the qualities-mental, physical, and
moral-of the reasonable careful person to which the Draft turns
when the Hand Formula seems unhelpful? Unlike the Restatement
(First), the Discussion Draft makes no attempt to sketch the por-
trait of the reasonably careful person. About all we can say is that
this person always acts in accord with the Hand Formula. There
must be more to it than that. For example, when the factfinder
asks, in cases of inadvertence, whether a reasonably careful person
would have recognized the risk, is the factfinder supposed to con-
sider what an average person would do, or what a careful person
would do? The Draft needs a thicker conception of the reasonable
person.
The Discussion Draft also downplays-in my view, mistak-
enly-the idea that a reasonable person attends to the Hand For-
mula factors. 126 Whereas the Restatement (First) incorporates the
Hand Formula into the reasonable person's decisionmaking, the
Discussion Draft presents the Hand Formula as a way for the judge
or jury to analyze alleged negligence. As I argued in Part II, judges
and juries are likely to make more effective use of the Hand For-
mula if it is linked to intuitions and experiences about how reason-
able people behave, rather than presented abstractly as a regula-
125. The Draft also adds a similar qualification to its treatment of the reasonably foreseeable
risk requirement. Comment f to Section 4 endorses the settled rule that the risk of harm must
be foreseeable at the time of the actor's conduct, but goes on to distinguish cases of inattentive-
ness to the risk from cases of conscious failure to investigate possible risk. Cases of inattentive-
ness are dealt with by direct application of the reasonable person standard. By contrast, "[iun
assessing whether the actor's failure to make that effort [to investigate) indicates that the actor
should have known of danger, courts commonly consider the factors included in the negligence
balancing approach." Discussion Draft, supra note 3, § 4 cmt. f-
126. For example, Comment g to Section 4 argues that "when the claim of negligence relates
to how a party conducts an activity that most people themselves engage in and are familiar with,
such as motoring, the jury's knowledge of the circumstances of the activity minimizes the need to
evaluate the party's conduct in the formal terms of risk magnitude and risk-prevention burdens."
Id. § 4 cmt. g. While the Discussion Draft is correct to stress the importance of the jury's knowl-
edge about driving, it does not follow that the Hand Factors are unhelpful in structuring the
jury's assessment of an actor's behavior. In everyday life, an activity like driving certainly pro-




tory template. 127 This point, however, plainly has more force as ap-
plied to jurors than to judges. For that reason, those who think the
Restatement's raison d'etre is confined to providing guidance to trial
and appellate judges are likely to find my criticism unconvincing.
I do not share this narrow view of the Restatement's role-
though I wholly agree that the Restatement does an important
service by spelling out the black letter law judges use to police and
control the jury in directed verdict practice and on appeal. But why
stop there? Because our tort system gives the jury the responsibility
of applying the negligence standard in the first instance, the Re-
statement can make an important additional contribution by help-
ing judges assist juries in understanding and applying the law,
thereby reducing the frequency of jury errors. As I will shortly ar-
gue, Hand Formula instructions are one form this guidance should
take. In addition, however, the Draft should make the balancing
approach to negligence more jury-friendly by putting the Hand
Formula "inside the head" of the reasonable person, as did the Re-
statement (First).
B. How are the Hand Factors to be Evaluated?
Comment d to Section 4 states that the balancing approach
rests on the "simple idea" that "conduct is negligent if its disadvan-
tages exceed its advantages." This is the Hand Norm at its most
general and inclusive: 128 anyone who thinks that accident avoidance
ought to be governed by a consequentialist norm can agree to this
much. But how are these disadvantages and advantages to be
evaluated? The Discussion Draft not only fails to provide an evalua-
tive standard, it fails to adequately acknowledge that this is even
an issue. Rather than alert readers that the Hand Factors require
evaluation-that is, value judgments-and that there are compet-
ing approaches to how that evaluation should be conducted, the
Draft simply asserts that the balancing approach "identifies impor-
tant variables for the jury to take into account" in coming to "an
informed judgment."'129 This is not a matter that should be swept
under the table.
Worse yet, the Discussion Draft can be read as denying that
value judgments are necessary at all. Comment g, which deals with
127. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
128. See also Discussion Draft, supra note 3, § 4 cmt. d (explaining that the risk-benefit test
can also be termed a" 'cost-benefit test,'" or a "'balancing approach' ").
129. Id. § 4 cmt g.
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problems of proof, notes that "[i]n most cases only limited informa-
tion is available" as to the Hand Formula factors, and concludes
that the Hand Formula approach cannot be "rendered operational
in a way that generates certain results."1 30 The implication is that if
we had perfect information about the Hand Factors, we would have
"certain results." Comment b to Section 5 seems to confirm that im-
plication, asserting that "[i]f the information bearing on [the Hand]
factors were fully available, there might frequently be an answer to
the negligence question that all reasonable minds must accept."1
31
The theory, in other words, appears to be that if all the Hand For-
mula facts were known, there would be no occasion for "an exercise
of judgment by the jury."
13 2
This "just the facts" 33 theory could be interpreted as a tacit
endorsement of Posner's wealth-maximization interpretation of the
Hand Formula. On the Posnerian view, full information about the
Hand Factors would yield "certain results" because that informa-
tion would consist of monetized values for PL and B. Those
monetized amounts would speak for themselves, leaving no room
for judgment. As Posner has explained, the "[c]onceptual as well as
practical difficulties in monetizing personal injuries" mean that
"[fJor many years to come juries may be forced to make rough judg-
ments of reasonableness, intuiting rather than measuring the fac-
tors in the Hand Formula." 134 But Posner's pragmatic hope is
plainly that such judgments will gradually be displaced as the ob-
stacles to monetization are overcome.
1 35
Now, if the Discussion Draft openly embraced Posner's
wealth-maximization version of the Hand Formula, it would be vul-
nerable to the serious descriptive (and normative) objections that
have been lodged against his approach. 136 On the other hand, Pos-
130. See id.
131. Id. § 5 cmt. b.
132. Id. ("[B]ecause the information presented at trial is commonly incomplete, reaching a
decision on the negligence issue requires an exercise of judgment by the jury.).
133. See Linda Ross Meyer, Just the Facts?, 106 YALE LJ. 1269, 1269 (1996) (reviewing
DEWEES, DUFF, & TREBILCOCic, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACcIDENT LAW: TAKMNG THE FACTS
SERIOUSLY (1996)).
134. McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.).
135. Learned Hand's view was more pessimistic. He wrote that the problem with "the ap-
praisal and balancing of human values" is that "there are no scales to weigh" them on; and he
emphasized that "the difficulty here does not come from ignorance, but from absence of any stan-
dard, for values are incommensurable" LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 161 (3d ed.
1960).
136. See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
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ner has ably defended his view,"3 7 and the debate would be an in-
tense and interesting one. Instead, the Draft seems to want to have
it both ways: it creates the appearance of inclusiveness by not speci-
fying how Hand Formula value judgments are to be made, but then
turns around and denies (or at least ignores) the need to make
value judgments, thereby inviting a reductionist approach to the
entire enterprise. 18
As I have already indicated, my preferred approach would
keep the Hand Formula incorporated within the reasonable person
standard, while directing courts and juries to make the necessary
value judgments in terms of the prevailing values in the commu-
nity. But if the Hand Formula is instead to be freestanding and
value-neutral-that is, divorced from the reasonable person and
silent on how value judgments are to be made-the Discussion
Draft should at least make clear that courts face choices as to the
method and metric for evaluating the Hand Factors. Some experi-
mentation and competition to develop an appealing and workable
version of Hand Formula evaluation might even be healthy.
C. The Jury's Role and the "Mixed Question" Issue
The Discussion Draft squarely affirms the prevailing view
that the jury applies the negligence standard unless reasonable
minds could not differ on that question, while signaling that this
rule "permits a significant number of directed verdicts."'139 The
Draft then goes on to acknowledge that applying the negligence
standard could be regarded as a question of law for the court be-
cause it is "a matter of the law's evaluation of the legal significance
of the actor's conduct," but acquiesces in "the longstanding Ameri-
can practice.., to treat the question as one that is equivalent to a
question of fact." 140 This concedes too much. Courts give this ques-
137. Most recently in Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophi-
cal Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99 (David Owen ed., 1995).
138. Alternatively, perhaps the Discussion Draft means to treat facts about values as facts,
interprets the information called for by the Hand Formula as including facts about values, and
assumes that the jury is familiar with these facts about values and will ordinarily base its judg-
ments on them. See Gilles, supra note 7, at 1031-32. If this is what the Discussion Draft intends,
it would be well to be more explicit about it. One does not normally think of the community's
values, or the average individual's values, as "information bearing on" the Hand Formula factors.
(On the other hand, there is precedent for that sort of usage: the Restatement (First) lumps tho
"social value" of the conflicting interests together with the Hand Factors, calling them all "fac-
tors" in its risk-utility analysis.)




tion to the jury as if it were a question of fact, but-following
Holmes, Bohlen, and Hand-courts also understand that this ques-
tion is, in actuality, a matter of law-making in the particular case.
For that reason, "a significant number of directed verdicts" is en-
tirely appropriate.
141
The lurking question of moral and value judgments surfaces
again in the Draft's explanations of why the jury is given the task of
applying the negligence standard. Comment c to Section 5 suggests
that the jury is given this responsibility partly "because of the de-
sirability of taking advantage of the insight of the community, as
embodied in the jury, rather than relying on the professional
knowledge of the judge." 42 Community insight into what? The
Draft, again reticent to discuss value judgments, offers no answer.
There is, however, a suggestive passage in Comment d to Section 5,
which argues that tort law has "accepted an ethics of particularism,
which tends to doubt the viability of general rules capable of pro-
ducing determinate results, and which requires that actual moral
judgments be based on the circumstances of each individual situa-
tion. Tort law's affirmation of this requirement highlights the pri-
mary role necessarily fulfilled by the jury."'43 This passage suggests
that the jury's evaluative role is tied to the need for "moral judg-
ments," not factual ones. But what sorts of moral judgments? And
how does morality enter into what the Draft treats as a question of
fact?
If there is a morality at work in the Draft, Comment j to Sec-
tion 4 may provide the best clues as to its character. Comment j ar-
gues that the balancing approach to negligence can be justified in
terms of both deterrence and fairness: deterrence, because the
threat of liability creates incentives to improve social welfare by
taking "reasonable safety precautions;" fairness, because a person
who imposes risks on others that exceed the burden that person
would bear to avoid the risks "violates the ethical norm of equal
consideration" by placing "personal interests or welfare ahead of
the interests or welfare of others."144 The reasonable person, on this
view, is someone who-whether from morality, fear of liability, or
both-complies with the norm of equal respect for the welfare of
others by taking precautionary measures that improve overall so-
cial welfare. The Draft thereby invites us to conclude that the foun-
141. Id.
142. Id. § 5 cmt. c.
143. Id. § 5 cmt. d.
144. Id. § 4 cmt. j.
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dation of negligence law is, broadly speaking, an ethic of social wel-
fare. Does it then follow that the Hand Factors should be evaluated
in terms of judgments about social welfare? Again, the Draft re-
treats into silence: we do not know whether the morality Comment j
speaks of is merely part of the justification for Hand Formula bal-
ancing, or is meant to infuse the evaluation of the Hand Factors by
courts and juries.
D. How Should the Jury be Instructed?
We come next to the vexing and important question of how
the jury should be instructed to apply the negligence standard. The
Discussion Draft never directly addresses this question. The Re-
porter's Notes to Section 4 mention that pattern jury instructions
are generally phrased in terms of the reasonably prudent person,
but point out that there is some authority approving Hand Formula
instructions. Along the same lines, Comment g to Section 4 states
that the Draft's Hand Formula or "balancing" approach "identifies
important variables for the jury to take into account in determining
whether the actor was negligent; the jury's responsibility is to ren-
der an informed judgment." 145 It's hard to resist drawing the infer-
ence that the jury should be told about the Hand Formula factors.
After all, how can the jury possibly "render an informed judgment"
if the trial court's instructions do not tell the jury what these vari-
ables are?
But one should not have to draw inferences on this point. For
the better part of a century now, there has been a disconnect be-
tween the gradual accretion of appellate Hand Formula doctrine
and the persistence of the undefined reasonable person instruction.
Rather than coyly hoping courts will get the point, the Discussion
Draft should confront this anomaly head-on. Why not simply tell
judges that if the case is one in which use of the Hand Formula fac-
tors is appropriate, the jury's attention should normally be directed
to those factors and to the need to balance them?
The Draft's failure to suggest that some kind of Hand For-
mula instructions should routinely be given is all the more puzzling
in light of the extensive discussion of "inevitable accident" instruc-
tions in the commentary on Section 3 (arguing that such instruc-
tions generally should not be given), of "Act of God" instructions in
the commentary on Section 4 (arguing that such instructions should
sometimes be given), and of "emergency" instructions in Section 7
145. Id. § 4 cmt. g.
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(noting reasons for and against giving such instructions). None of
these jury-instruction issues is remotely as important as whether to
give some sort of Hand Formula instruction.
Nor is it the case that the gap between negligence doctrine
and negligence instructions is a settled feature of tort law that
must be respected and incorporated into the Discussion Draft. Some
appellate courts have approved Hand Formula instructions in par-
ticular cases; others use instructions that invoke the balancing of
pros and cons by reasonable persons in taking care of their own
persons and property. Most important, there is virtually no author-
ity affirmatively rejecting Hand Formula instructions (though it
may be that some trial judges would refuse to give them). For all
their positive orientation, the Restatements have appropriately
aimed to change the law by clarifying it, making it more certain,
and choosing the better approach where there were two or more
competing ones in the case law. We should add the goal of convey-
ing the law more fully and more clearly to the factfinder to this list
of desirable changes.
If the Discussion Draft were to recommend Hand Formula
instructions, what form should they take? In previous work, I ar-
gued that the reasonable person standard could in fact function as
an intuitive Hand Formula approach if courts instructed juries that
reasonable care is the care a prudent person takes of his or her own
person and property. 146 That still seems to me a promising approach
because it is simple and non-technical (and because it has some
support in the case law and in the jury instructions). But it is by no
means the only approach worth considering. For example, juries
could be told (1) that the question is whether the actor behaved as a
reasonable person would have, (2) that reasonable persons give
equal regard to the interests of others where risks of physical injury
are concerned, 147 and (3) that reasonable people assess the pros and
146. Gilles, supra note 7; see also DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAWts ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS
TO Do WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 198 (2000) C(A more intuitive way of putting [the Hand
Formula] is that a party who imposes costs on others does so negligently if he has failed to take
precautions that a reasonable person would have taken if he himself were the one bearing the
cost of the accident.").
147. Some critics of economic analysis worry that giving jurors Hand Formula instructions
might encourage them to undervalue the interests of accident victims. The fear is that, when
people are told to do cost-benefit analysis, they will tend to adopt a selfish, non.altruistic outlook.
The instruction in text should reduce this risk, because it specifies that the interests of others
are to be given equal weight. In this connection, it should also be remembered that jurors en-
gaged in cost-benefit analysis, are tot balancing their own interests against the interests of oth-
ers; they are balancing the interests of defendants against those of plaintiffs. Hence, the risk
that jurors will take a selfish perspective would seem to be counterbalanced by the risk that
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cons of taking additional precautions by attending to the Hand Fac-
tors and evaluating them in light of prevailing community values.
Instructions such as these, of course, prompt the familiar
objection that juries just simply are not the right kind of decision-
maker to do cost-benefit analysis. This objection comes in two main
forms: that juries cannot handle cost-benefit analysis, and that ju-
ries will refuse to apply cost-benefit analysis. I will consider them
in that order.
Certainly, many observers think that even if cost-benefit
analysis is sometimes a sensible way for regulators to make deci-
sions, it is not a sensible way to ask lay juries to decide. On this
view, while Bohlen may have been right that the jury's role in de-
termining negligence is in some sense "administrative," the fact
remains that juries lack the institutional features of true adminis-
trative agencies. They are one-shot bodies of lay citizens, not per-
manent staffs that bring together economic and regulatory exper-
tise. Just as some students panic whenever math rears its ugly
quantitative head, so many jurors will be confused and disoriented
by Hand Formula instructions. They will not learn anything-in-
deed, they will forget what they already know-and hence their
judgments will degenerate, not improve. In sum, the argument
goes, it is fine for courts to use the Hand Formula on appeal or in
directed verdict practice, but giving juries Hand Formula instruc-
tions would be a recipe for disaster.
This is an empirical question about which neither side can
reasonably be dogmatic. That said, I think there is reason for opti-
mism. Compared to some of the antitrust, securities, or tax doc-
trines that juries are instructed to apply, Hand Formula instruc-
tions are much closer to ordinary experience. Moreover, if the Hand
Formula is presented as part of the reasonable person standard,
jurors who are baffled by the Formula can always fall back on their
intuitions about how a reasonable person would have behaved. And
while empirical uncertainty is good reason for caution, it is also the
best of reasons for experimentation. Were the Discussion Draft to
recommend Hand Formula instructions, the result might well be a
natural experiment in which some state courts follow its advice,
while others adhere to the undefined reasonable person instruction.
Over time, we could expect more evidence on which to base an as-
sessment of Hand Formula instructions.
jurors will take an excessively altruistic perspective because they can compensate an injured
person with somebody else's money.
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The claim that Hand Formula instructions would provoke
jury nullification is supported by considerable evidence: (1) recent
work by W. Kip Viscusi documenting aversion to risk analysis and
cost-benefit analysis among jurors; 148 (2) Gary Schwartz's report of
conversations with product liability defense lawyers who are afraid
to mount a costly-precautions defense (despite the availability of
risk-utility instructions) because of the risk of jury backlash, 149 and
(3) the skeptical-to-hostile reactions many law students have when
they first encounter cost-benefit analysis in their study of tort
law. 150 But this evidence cannot reasonably be taken to show that
jury backlash would occur in all or most cases. Indeed, defense law-
yers routinely make some types of cost-benefit arguments in design
defect cases; for example, they argue that the plaintiffs suggested
design would create more safety risks than it avoids, or would seri-
ously compromise the product's utility to consumers. The Hand
Formula serves as a platform for a wide range of arguments, only
one of which-that the monetary costs of a precaution justify not
taking it-seems to meet with serious popular resistance. And even
that resistance may be lower in ordinary negligence cases than in
product liability cases, because the latter are more likely to involve
institutional defendants with deep pockets and precaution costs
that are modest on a per-unit basis. 15 1
Nevertheless, if courts gave Hand Formula instructions in
negligence cases, it seems clear that juries would sometimes refuse
to follow them, and that defendants would often be leery of arguing
that the monetary costs of a precaution, standing alone, justified its
omission. Yet why is this a decisive objection for the ALIs constitu-
encies-law professors, judges, and lawyers-all of whom profess an
unwavering commitment to the rule of law? Rebellious juries are a
poor proxy for legitimate democratic lawmakers. Prudence may dic-
tate that courts give some consideration to jury sensibilities in
148. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L REV. 547
(2000); W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 107 (2001).
149. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1038
(1991).
150. See Kenneth Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 70 B.U. L. REV. 463, 512-13 (1992).
151. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the reasonable person standard, if applied by the jury
with reference to how people ordinarily behave, may well involve less consideration for others
than the Hand Formula, with its premise that everyone's interests are on a par. (Recall
Dworkin's complaint that the Hand Formula is too demanding to be universalized to all other-
regarding conduct.) This leads to the intriguing possibility that defendants may sometimes
"waive" reliance on cost-benefit analysis not because they are afraid the jury will be antagonized
by it, but because they will do better to invoke prevailing (and more forgiving) community norms.
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framing Hand Formula instructions. But that can be done without
abandoning the entire enterprise. I suspect that juries would find
Hand Formula instructions more congenial if those instructions
were linked to community values and the jury's sense of justice
(and, conversely, least congenial if linked to a willingness-to-pay
metric). 152 We should also bear in mind the social dynamic that
could ensue: juries would be less likely to bridle if, over time, Hand
Formula balancing became part of what "everybody knows" about
the meaning of negligence. The bottom line, then, should be to rec-
ommend that courts adopt (at least on a trial basis) jury-friendly
Hand Formula instructions that gloss the reasonable person stan-
dard.
The arguments I have offered in support of Hand Formula
instructions will not persuade scholars such as Richard Wright,
who think jury resistance to Hand Formula balancing in fact re-
flects a different and better conception of negligence. To them, the
Hand Formula, risk-utility analysis, and "balancing" interests are
just so many distortions of the true reasonable person standard.
The courts' reluctance to give Hand Formula instructions, Wright
suggests, is evidence that the Hand Formula really is not the pre-
vailing conception of negligence.153
This argument is unpersuasive. The courts' failure to rou-
tinely give Hand Formula instructions certainly indicates some am-
bivalence about asking juries to engage in cost-benefit analysis. But
the basis for that ambivalence is plainly the jury, not the black let-
ter law-which in most states is couched in terms of Hand Formula
balancing. The reasons courts would give-if they gave reasons,
which with rare exceptions they have not-concern the jury's ability
to understand and apply Hand Formula instructions,154 the risk
152. For example, juries could be told that the reasonable person gives equal weight to the
interests of others in matters of safety, and takes the same care with regard to others' safety that
a reasonably careful person would take of his or her own person or property. Under this ap-
proach, a defendant could raise cost-benefit analysis comfortably by pointing out to the jury that
we all make tradeoffs with regard to our own safety and that of our property, and arguing-with
explicit support from the jury instruction-that making similar tradeoffs with regard to the
safety of others does not constitute negligence.
153. Richard Wright, The Standards of Care in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF TORT LAW 249, 263 (David Owen ed., 1995).
154. For example, the principal ground on which Leon Green attacked the Restatenment
(First) was that its formulations were not suitable for use as jury instructions. Green wrote:
Cases come to the courts through formal pleadings cut to some pattern or pat-
terns of legal theory. Evidential data are offered to support these and the op-
posing theories. There is no suggestion that the tenor of the Restatement is de.
signed for these purposes. After the evidence is heard the theories insisted
upon by the parties through their lawyers are translated to the jury by instruc-
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that detailed instructions will somehow invade the jury's discretion,
and the like.155 As I have already argued, these reasons should not
stand in the way of experimentation with Hand Formula instruc-
tions.
CONCLUSION
As we discuss and critique the Discussion Draft's provisions
governing "breach" in the tort of negligence, we do well to remem-
ber the precedent set by the Restatement (First), which situated the
Hand Formula within negligence law, and within the reasonable
person standard in particular, rather than using the Hand Formula
to supplant the traditional schema. The Discussion Draft is surely
not intended to replace the reasonable person standard with the
Hand Formula. But in trying to be inclusive, the Reporter may have
ended up with too thin a conception of both Hand Formula balanc-
ing and the reasonably careful person. The Discussion Draft should
flesh out the former by addressing the need for value judgments in
evaluating the Hand Factors, and the latter by specifying that the
reasonable person gives equal weight to the interests of others. Fi-
nally, the Discussion Draft should urge courts to use Hand Formula
instructions, not to the exclusion of reasonable person instructions,
but as a gloss on how reasonable people make decisions about acci-
dent avoidance.
tions in terms of formulas. Certainly the black letter statements are not in-
tended to supplant the formulas already worked out and utilized by the courts
in tort cases. They are too ponderous and elaborate for such a purpose. As-
suming that a judge would know which ones to give, no jury would comprehend
them.
Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 U. ILL. L REV. 582, 595 (1935).
155. For an example of this reasoning, see Gilles, supra note 7, at 1049 (discussing rejection
of model cost-benefit instruction by Los Angeles trial judges on grounds it would invade the
province of the jury).
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